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JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2a-3(2)(f).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The State has filed two separate opening briefs, one prior to remand and one
following remand. Solomon Ford will cite to the first brief with "First Br." and the
second brief with "Second Br."
I.

Issues Presented in the State's First Opening Brief
Mr. Ford disputes the State's characterization of the issues in the first brief.

Mr. Ford will therefore restate the issues after providing some context.
Mr. Ford served 13 years of a 15-year sentence after being convicted of possession
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. (R. 52, 340.) Specifically, while Mr. Ford
was paroled, officers found (i) a handgun holster in an apartment next door to where
Mr. Ford's girlfriend lived and (ii) parts of a shotgun, but not a barrel—insufficient parts
to permit its use as a weapon—in a gym bag in his girlfriend's apartment.1
In 1999, Mr. Ford—acting pro se—unsuccessfully attempted to raise the
constitutional issue that his conviction is void because he was denied a preliminary
hearing by a magistrate as required by article I, section 13. (R. 294:4, 15.) Judge Medley
construed his 1999 petition as raising a separate issue concerning only the
unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority and denied the petition as procedurally
barred under the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). (First Br. at 4.)
In 2005, Mr. Ford—still acting pro se—filed the current petition with the district
court raising his article I, section 13 argument, which the district court recognized as
1

If the Court concludes that the record of Mr. Ford's original trial becomes relevant to
this appeal, Mr. Ford can supply a copy of that transcript.
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such. (R. 4, 147.) In the first opening brief, the State construes Mr. Ford's petition as
raising merely an unconstitutional delegation argument—the issue Judge Medley ruled he
was procedurally barred from considering in 1999—and contends that this argument is
procedurally barred under the PCRA. While Mr. Ford does raise an unconstitutional
delegation argument under article V, section 1, and article VIII, section 1, Mr. Ford's
primary argument is that a magistrate did not preside over his preliminary hearing, as
constitutionally required under article I, section 13,4 an entirely separate constitutional
violation. Until the district court addressed the article I, section 13 issue in this
proceeding, it had never before been recognized in any of Mr. Ford's petitions.
Issue 1: Whether the article I, section 13 right to a preliminary hearing by
magistrate—a substitute for the ancient right to indictment by grand jury—requires that a
member of the judicial branch determine whether probable cause exists.
Issue 2: Whether the Utah Constitution permits the legislature to delegate
authority to conduct preliminary hearings to someone not a member of the judicial
branch.
Standard of Review: The Court reviews interpretations of the Utah Constitution
for correctness. Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57, ^6, 52 P.3d 1148.
"The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed
or permitted." Utah Const, art. V, § 1.
"The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court of
general jurisdiction known as a district court, and in such other courts as the Legislature
by statute may establish." Utah Const, art. VIII, §1.
4
"Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by
information after examination and commitment by a magistrate." Utah Const, art I, § 13.
6471112
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II.

Issues Raised in the State's Second Opening Brief
For the most part, Mr. Ford agrees with the State's framing of the three right to

counsel issues presented in the second opening brief, but not one of the standards of
review. The State correctly notes that all three issues concern very narrow circumstances
in which (i) a district court has granted a habeas petition (or petition for post-conviction
relief); (ii) in granting the petition, the court has vacated the legal basis of confinement;
and (iii) the State has decided to appeal the district court's ruling. (Second Br. at 2.)
The State construes the scope of the statutory right to counsel as co-extensive with
the federal constitutional right to counsel. Mr. Ford therefore will address the scope of
the constitutional rights to counsel before addressing the statutory right to counsel.
Issue 3: Whether the rights to counsel and to due process under the United States
Constitution require that individual states must provide counsel to the indigent when a
state employs the judicial process to alter the status quo and to acquire the legal basis to
imprison an indigent individual.
Standard of Review: The Court reviews interpretations of the United States
Constitution for correctness. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).
Issue 4: Whether the district court abused its discretion by appointing counsel
under the Utah Constitution where the State is employing the judicial process to alter the
status quo and to acquire the legal basis to imprison an indigent individual.
Standard of Review: The question of whether to appoint counsel under article I,
section 12 is "left to the discretion of the trial judge, with his action subject to review for
abuse of discretion." State v. Eichler, 483 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1971).
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Issue 5: Whether the Indigent Defense Act requires the State to provide counsel
to the indigent when the State employs the judicial process to alter the status quo and to
acquire the legal basis to imprison an indigent.
Standard of Review: The Court reviews interpretations of statutes for
correctness. MacFarlane v. State Tax Comm'n, 2006 UT 25, f9, 134 P.3d 1116.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Constitution, article I, section 5
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case
of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it.
Utah Constitution, article I, section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law.
Utah Constitution, article I, section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel.... In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed.
Utah Constitution, article I, section 13:
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted
by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment.
Utah Constitution, article V, section 1
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others,
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
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Utah Constitution, article VIII, section 1:
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court
of general jurisdiction known as a district court, and in such other courts as the
Legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court, and
other such courts designated by statute shall be courts of record. Courts of record
shall also be established by statute.
Utah Constitution, article VIII, section 3:
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. The
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be
exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs and orders necessary
for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination
of any cause.
Amendment VI to the United States Constitution
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... have the Assistance of counsel
for his defense.
Amendment XIV to the United States Constitution
No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.

6471U2
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This case involves the State's imprisonment of a man for 13 years without first

affording him his constitutional right to a preliminary hearing before a magistrate, a right
enshrined in article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution. Mr. Ford's hearing was
conducted by a court commissioner, someone the State concedes had no authority to
exercise judicial powers. The underlying basis for Mr. Ford's conviction is thin
enough—possession of a dangerous weapon, where no functional weapon was ever
found, let alone produced as evidence—to make the denial of this right significant. As
the State recognizes, absent an article I, section 13 preliminary hearing, the original trial
court could not have obtained subject matter jurisdiction. This Court has inherent
authority under article VIII, section 3, and the habeas corpus provision of article I,
section 5, to address the merits of a petition challenging subject matter jurisdiction.
This case also presents the question of whether the State has an obligation to
provide paid legal counsel to an indigent person when the State employs the judicial
process to obtain the legal authority to imprison that person. After the district court
granted Mr. Ford's habeas petition and vacated his sentence, the State had two avenues
for dealing with Mr. Ford. First, it could have accepted the district court's proffered
opportunity to re-try Mr. Ford, if it could first establish probable cause in a preliminary
hearing before a magistrate. (R. 240.) Second, the State could have dropped the case
because Mr. Ford had already spent 13 (of a possible 15) years in prison for possession of
a weapon. The State chose to pursue a third route—to prosecute this appeal and to seek
the authority to send Mr. Ford, who is now free, back to prison.

6471112
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II.

Course of Proceedings
On June 3, 2005, Mr. Ford—acting pro se—filed a pleading he titled "Relief From

a Void Judgment and Order Rule 60(b)(4)." (R. 1.) The district court and the State
construed this pleading as a petition to vacate his conviction on the ground that the
original trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. (R. 40, 144.)
On October 19, 2005, the State moved to dismiss the petition because it was
procedurally barred under the under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code
sections 78-35a-101, et seq. (R. 43-48.) Mr. Ford represented himself in opposing the
motion. (R. 34.) On January 9, 2006, the district court held a hearing on the motion,
after which it ordered the State to address the merits of the petition. (R. 101, 294:16-17.)
In its memorandum addressing the merits, the State argued that the commissioner
presiding over Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing had de facto judicial authority and was
authorized by the legislature to conduct such hearings. (R. 102-113.) Mr. Ford—again
acting pro se—responded by arguing that because a member of the judicial branch did not
conduct the preliminary hearing, his conviction is void, and this argument cannot be
procedurally barred because it concerns subject matter jurisdiction. (R. 122-26.)
On April 25, 2006, the district court granted Mr. Ford's petition. (R. 144.) In its
decision, the district court first addressed the jurisdictional question in the context of
article I, section 13's requirement that a magistrate conduct the preliminary hearing. (R.
147.) The district court recognized that the Judicial Council had not authorized
commissioners to conduct preliminary hearings. (R. 148.) The court then rejected the
State's argument that this problem could be overcome with the doctrines of de facto
authority and waiver, concluding that the failure to provide an article I, section 13 hearing
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by a judicial officer precluded the original trial court from obtaining subject matter
jurisdiction, a defect not subject to waiver under the PCRA.5 (R. 150-51.)
After granting the petition, the district court appointed counsel from the Salt Lake
Legal Defenders Association ("SLDA") to represent Mr. Ford and to address whether
Mr. Ford was entitled only to a new trial or to immediate release. (R. 152.) On June 21,
2006, the district court—assuming the State would not find 13 years sufficient
punishment for possession of a dangerous weapon—ordered the State either (i) to provide
Mr. Ford a preliminary hearing and new trial or (ii) to release him immediately. (R. 240.)
On June 26, 2006, the State sought a third option by filing a motion to stay the district
court's judgment pending appeal. (R. 246.) On August 1, 2006, the district court denied
the motion to stay. (R. 277.) The State then unsuccessfully sought to have this Court
stay the judgment. (R. 280.) On August 15, 2006, the district court ordered Mr. Ford
released from prison. (R. 284.) On July 10, 2006, the State filed a notice of appeal,
which is deemed to have been filed on August 15, 2006, when the final judgment was
entered. (R. 255.)
After the State filed its first opening brief, this Court remanded the case so that
SLDA could withdraw as counsel for Mr. Ford due to a conflict of interest. (R. 295-96.)
On February 26, 2007, the district court appointed Jennifer Gowans and Randall Spencer
5

While it is somewhat difficult to separate the district court's article I, section 13 analysis
from its unconstitutional delegation analysis, this confusion is irrelevant. (First Br. at
16.) "It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it
is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or
action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed
on by the lower court." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,1[10, 52 P.3d 1158 (internal
quotations omitted).
6471112
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to represent Mr. Ford. (R. 303.) On March 2, 2007, Mr. Ford moved to have his current
counsel substituted for SLDA (which had already withdrawn) or for Ms. Gowans and
Mr. Spencer (who had not yet entered an appearance). (R. 305.) On March 12, 2007,
Mr. Ford moved the district court to appoint his new counsel as paid counsel under the
Indigent Defense Act ("IDA"), the Utah Constitution, and the United States Constitution.
(R. 319.) On March 19, 2007, the district court entered an order approving the
appointment of Mr. Ford's current counsel after the State had stipulated to the
appointment, leaving only a dispute concerning whether the appointment should be pro
bono or paid. (R. 339.)
Mr. Ford then notified Salt Lake County that he was seeking appointment of paid
counsel by sending it courtesy copies of all the relevant pleadings. (R. 393.) In support
of his motion, Mr. Ford filed affidavits demonstrating his continued indigency. (R. 340.)
Mr. Ford explained in his affidavit that he had been working at Kimball Equipment
Company in Salt Lake City since the time he was released from prison, but his $1,740
monthly income leaves only $208 in discretionary income each month, after taxes, living
expenses, and child support for Mr. Ford's son are deducted. (R. 341, 416.) Mr. Ford
then filed the affidavit of Tawni J. Anderson Sherman, who testified that defending
against the State's appeal would cost between $15,000 and $45,000. (R. 389, 416.)
On May 31, 2007, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Ford's motion to appoint
paid counsel. (R. 413). After the hearing, the district court granted Mr. Ford's motion
and directed counsel for Mr. Ford to provide a copy of its order to the County. (R. 413.)
The district court specifically found—based upon evidence in the written record and
representations of Mr. Ford's counsel at the hearing—that the County had been notified
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of the hearing, as required under the IDA. (R. 417.) The district court then ruled that
Mr. Ford is entitled to paid counsel under the IDA, the Utah Constitution, and the United
States Constitution. (R. 417-423.)
On June 28, 2007, the State appealed the district court's order appointing paid
counsel. (R. 427.) This Court consolidated both of the State's appeals.
III.

Statement of Facts
On August 19, 1993, the State charged Mr. Ford by information with possession of

a dangerous weapon and aggravated assault. (R.144) Mr. Ford promptly invoked his
constitutional right to a preliminary hearing, and on September 9, 1993, a circuit court
commissioner, Frances Palacios, who was not a member of the judicial branch, bound
Mr. Ford over for trial. (R.10.) Mr. Ford was acquitted on the assault charge, but was
convicted on the weapon charge. (R. 52.) Mr. Ford served 13 years before being
released in August 2006. (R. 284.)

6471112
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the first opening brief, filed before the remand, the State argues that Mr. Ford's
jurisdictional claims were procedurally barred by the legislature when it enacted the
PCRA. This is incorrect. This Court has inherent constitutional powers under article
VIII, section 3 and the habeas corpus provision in article I, section 5, to consider the
merits of a collateral attack on an original trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.6
On the merits, the State makes two concessions that demonstrate the original trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. First, the State concedes that an article I, section
13 preliminary hearing is a constitutional prerequisite for a trial court to obtain subject
matter jurisdiction over a criminal matter. (First Br. at 22-23.) Second, the State
concedes that the circuit court commissioner who presided over Mr. Ford's preliminary
hearing was not a judicial officer. (First Br. at 17, 19, 21.) The State attempts to escape
the conclusion that the original trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction by asserting
that a preliminary hearing need not be conducted by a member of the judicial branch.
The State's assertion is incorrect.
The Magna Carta enshrined the requirement that before citizens can be forced to
endure a felony trial, the prosecuting executive must show an independent judicial
body—the grand jury—that probable cause exists to believe the crime was committed. In
the late nineteenth century, states began experimenting with a substitute to the use of
grand juries in felony cases by permitting the showing of probable cause to be made at a
preliminary hearing before a judicial officer instead of a full grand jury. This right to

6

Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85, 87, 448 P.2d 907 (1968); Thompson v. Harris, 106
Utah 32, 40, 144 P.2d 761 (1943).
6471112
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preliminary hearings made is way into article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution, as
did the requirement that such hearing be conducted by a member of the judiciary. Article
I, section 13 uses the term "magistrate," a word defined as one with the authority to
exercise judicial powers. State v. Mclntrye, 92 Utah 177, 183; 66 P.3d 879, 882 (Utah
1937). Early case law establishes this definition, and no recent case law calls it into
question. The State's assertion that any "lawyer with criminal law experience" may
preside over a preliminary hearing is without historical support. Under the Utah
Constitution, the hearing must be conducted by a member of the judiciary, something that
did not happen in Mr. Ford's case. Therefore, the original trial court never obtained
jurisdiction to try Mr. Ford.
Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing contained an additional constitutional defect—the
legislature made an unconstitutional delegation of judicial powers to a non-judicial
officer in authorizing, by statute, the commissioner to preside over Mr. Ford's
preliminary hearing. The State contends that magistrates do not exercise judicial
authority because they do not enter final judgments and that, even if did exercise judicial
authority, the commissioner had de facto judicial authority when acting as a magistrate.
Both arguments fail. First, magistrates do enter final judgments—when they dismiss an
information—and therefore, under the State's criteria, they exercise judicial power.
Second, under the de facto authority doctrine the first citizen to raise the separation of
powers violation—in this case Mr. Ford—can benefit from the violation. Therefore,
Mr. Ford is entitled to be released. The Court may affirm on this independent basis.
In the State's second opening brief, it argues that the trial court erred in ruling that
Mr. Ford has a right to paid counsel under the Indigent Defense Act, the Utah
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Constitution, and the United States Constitution. The State's argument is premised
entirely upon the distinction between civil proceedings and criminal proceedings, and the
assertion that post-conviction proceedings are civil. As Mr. Ford pointed out in the trial
court, this distinction cannot carry the weight the State would place on it. The right to
counsel sometimes does attach in "civil" proceedings, namely juvenile "criminal" cases,
parental rights termination cases, and parole revocation hearings. And the right to
counsel sometimes does not attach in "criminal" proceedings, namely where a defendant
files a discretionary appeal after his sentence is affirmed in an appeal of right. The
distinction relevant to the question of the entitlement to paid counsel that these cases
reveal is whether the State is attempting to deprive a citizen of a fundamental right, such
as liberty. When such a deprivation is the probable consequence of the State's
proceeding against a party, the party is entitled to paid counsel.
This is reflected in Utah law recognizing there is a right to counsel for probation
(and parole) revocation hearings, but no such right to counsel in parole grant hearings,
where prisoners have already lost their liberty. It is also reflected in federal law
recognizing the right to counsel to defend against a state's discretionary appeal after a
defendant's successful appeal of right granting relief, but no right to counsel for a
defendant to prosecute a discretionary appeal after an unsuccessful appeal of right. The
key is whether the State is attempting to upset the legal status quo by obtaining the right
to deprive a citizen of a fundamental liberty interest.
Here, the State is attempting to send Mr. Ford back to prison, where he already
spent 13 years for a conviction for gun possession. Therefore, to defend against the
State's appeal, Mr. Ford has the right to paid counsel.
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ARGUMENT
Mr. Ford spent 13 years in prison after being convicted of possessing a dangerous
weapon, even though the State never complied with the constitutional prerequisite for
filing the information—that the charge be submitted for "examination and commitment
by a magistrate." Utah Const, art. I, § 13. Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing was instead
conducted by a commissioner who had no judicial authority. As the State notes, if
Mr. Ford was denied this constitutional right, then "the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to try him under the existing precedent." (First Br. at 23.) In the first
opening brief, the State makes two arguments to avoid this result: (i) the PCRA prevents
the Court from considering the merits of Mr. Ford's petition and (ii) the language in
article I, section 13 requiring examination and commitment by "a magistrate" does not
refer to a member of the judicial branch. Both arguments fail.
First, this Court's review of Mr. Ford's petition derives not from the PCRA, but
from its inherent constitutional powers under article Villi, section 3, and the habeas
corpus provision in article I, section 5. Utah law has always recognized that (i) the
judiciary has constitutional authority to vacate a conviction and sentence in the interest of
justice and (ii) the "interests of justice" includes circumstances in which the original trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The passage of 13 years that Mr. Ford spent in
prison only heightens the injustice; it does not, as the State argues, cure the violation
under a legislatively created rule of procedure.

7

In fact, if Mr. Ford's conviction is reinstated, his conviction would provide a basis for
federal prosecution of a parole violation. Without the conviction, like the State, federal
prosecutors would have to prove that Mr. Ford possessed a dangerous weapon.
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Second, the history of article I, section 13 demonstrates that preliminary hearings
must be conducted by a member of the independent judiciary, not anyone who happens to
be a "lawyer with criminal law experience," as the State repeatedly suggests. (First Br. at
29.) As demonstrated below, Mr. Ford was denied his right to the preliminary hearing
required by article I, section 13, a prerequisite to the executive branch having authority to
prosecute and to the trial court obtaining subject matter jurisdiction. The district court
was correct to vacate Mr. Ford's conviction and sentence.
Finally, after the district court vacated Mr. Ford's conviction and sentence and
released him, the State decided that it wanted Mr. Ford to serve more than the 13 years he
had already spent in prison for possession of a dangerous weapon, but it did not want to
provide Mr. Ford a proper preliminary hearing and new trial. The State instead attempts
to achieve the same legal result—gaining authority to deprive Mr. Ford of his liberty and
send him back to prison—by filing this appeal. Had the State chose to re-try Mr. Ford, he
undisputedly would have had the right to counsel. As demonstrated below, this right to
counsel cannot be extinguished simply because the State has chosen to deprive Mr. Ford
of the same liberty though the appellate courts instead of the trial court.
I.

Mr. Ford's Claims Are Not Procedurally Barred; Therefore, the Court
Should Address the Merits of Mr. Ford's Petition
In the first opening brief, the State assumes that the procedural bars described in

the Post-Conviction Relief Act restrict this Court's authority to reach the merits of
Mr. Ford's petition. As described below, this assumption is incorrect for two reasons.
First, as the State now recognizes in its second opening brief: "The Utah Supreme Court
has concluded that the judicial branch has state constitutional authority for post-
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conviction review of a criminal conviction under Art I, § 5 and Art. VIII." (Second Br. at
30.) Therefore, this Court should review the petition pursuant to its constitutional
authority, not the PCRA. Second, even ignoring the Court's constitutional powers, the
State's procedural bar arguments under the PCRA do not apply to Mr. Ford's claims
because Mr. Ford has good cause for failing to raise them previously. For both reasons,
the Court should address the merits.
A.

The Court Has Inherent Constitutional Authority to Review the Merits
of Mr. Ford's Petition

The Court has the constitutional authority under article VII, section 3, and article I,
section 5, to review the merits of Mr. Ford's petition. Article I, section 5 provides that
"[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it." Utah Const. Art. I, § 5. Neither
statutes nor rules of procedure can diminish this Court's inherent constitutional authority,
except where another constitutional provision expressly authorizes such interference,
something absent here. Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 253 (Utah 1998) ("the legislature
may not impose restrictions which limit the writ as a judicial rule of procedure, except as
provided in the constitution"); State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, f7 n.4, 127 P.3d 682
(recognizing that Rule 65B cannot "diminish the availability of extraordinary relief).
A statute, such as the PCRA, could not deprive the judicial branch of this
constitutional authority. At the time Utah became a state, courts routinely reviewed
criminal convictions in habeas petitions, especially when they involved jurisdictional
challenges. This point is demonstrated by a case strikingly similar to this one decided by
the United States Supreme Court in 1884. In Ex parte Wilson, the Court granted a habeas
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petition where "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of years at hard labor is
an infamous crime, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution; and
the District Court, in holding the petitioner to answer for such a crime, and sentencing
him to such imprisonment, without indictment or presentment by a grand jury, exceeded
its jurisdiction, and he is therefore entitled to be discharged." 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1884)
(emphasis added). In other words, constitutional checks on prosecutorial discretion are
sufficiently important that the failure to comply with them not only precludes subject
matter jurisdiction but also permits a court to vacate a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt verdict
on habeas review.
Utah law is in accord. In 1875, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah
released a prisoner on habeas corpus because the Justice of the Peace did not have
jurisdiction to arrest. Ex parte Dixon, 1 Utah 192, 193 (1875). Jurisdiction was lacking
because service of the summons was defective, which rendered the judgment "void." Id
After Utah became a state, the rule was no different. Winnovich v. Emery, 33 Utah 345,
361, 93 P. 988, 994 (1908) (recognizing that "on habeas corpus proceedings," if a court
determines that "there was no preliminary examination or hearing by the magistrate, the
accused should be discharged").
Here, Mr. Ford's petition claims that the original trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction and therefore his conviction and sentence are "a nullity and void." (R. 5.)
This places Mr. Ford's petition squarely within the historical scope of the Court's
constitutional authority.8 Areson v. Pincock, 220 P. 503, 504 (Utah 1923) ("Habeas
8

The fact that the district court was led to construe the petition as falling under the PCRA
and Rule 65C, instead of article I, section 5, is irrelevant. (R. 151.) Appellate courts are
not bound by how a petition is characterized—either by the parties or a lower court—but
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corpus takes cognizance only of defects of a jurisdictional character, which render the
proceedings not merely voidable; but absolutely void."). As the Utah Supreme Court has
explained, "a writ of habeas corpus was classically used to challenge the lawfulness of a
physical restraint under which a person was held or the jurisdiction and sentence of a
court that convicted a person," and provides "a post-conviction remedy in unusual
circumstances to determine whether a person was convicted in violation of principles of
fundamental fairness or whether the sentence imposed is void." Renn v. Utah State Bd.
of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 681-82 (Utah 1995) (emphasis added). Thus, this Court may
adjudicate the merits of Mr. Ford's petition because it demonstrates that his original trial
court "had no jurisdiction over the person or the offense." Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d
96, 98, 440 P.2d 968 (1968); see also Thompson v. Harris, 106 Utah 32, 40, 144 P.2d 761
(1943).
The lack of jurisdiction precludes all procedural bars. As the Utah Supreme Court
has explained, even where a jurisdictional claim could have and should have been raised
previously, a conviction "can be subjected to collateral attack . . . when the interests of
justice so demand because of some extraordinary circumstances or exigency: e.g., lack of
jurisdiction." Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85, 87,448 P.2d 907 (1968) (emphasis
added). The Court has recognized the constitutional authority to review post-conviction
petitions extends even to cases in which there has been no showing of prejudice.
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81; ffi[61, 62,150 P.3d 480 (holding that relief under Rule
60(b) was appropriate despite statutory bars because a "post-conviction proceeding is a
look "to the substance of the action and the nature of the relief sought in determining the
true nature of the extraordinary relief requested." Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904
P.2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995).
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proceeding of constitutional importance, over which the judiciary has supervisory
responsibilities due to our constitutional role"). In short, this Court has the constitutional
authority to review the merits of Mr. Ford's petition.9
B.

The State's Procedural Bar Argument Fails Because Judge Medley Did
Not Construe the Third Petition As Raising a Jurisdictional Claim

The State's procedural bar argument under the PCRA fails for another reason.
The State's primary procedural argument is that Mr. Ford's claims in his current petition
are barred because they were raised in Mr. Ford's earlier third petition. This is not so.
As the district court recognized, in adjudicating the third petition (on procedural
grounds) Judge Medley expressly construed the pro se petition as not raising a
jurisdictional challenge: "Petitioner's challenge to the court commissioner's authority to
preside at his preliminary hearing does not state a challenge to the Court's jurisdiction to
try petitioner." (R. 54-55, 151 (emphasis added).) The State's briefs in the district court
confirm this. When addressing the merits of the current petition, the State characterized
Judge Medley's previous order as follows: the third petition's "challenge to the court
commissioner's authority to preside at his preliminary hearing did not state a challenge to
the court's jurisdiction to try petitioner; therefore, the claim was procedurally barred."
(R. 45.) According to the State, only in "subsequent pleadings"—meaning the petition at

9

In its first brief, the State repeatedly cites State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, 147 P.3d 448,
for the proposition that the district court should not have relied on its own reasoning in
resolving the petition. Robison does not mention a district court's authority to reason its
way to a just conclusion, but instead only cautions appellate courts reviewing district
court decisions not to reverse on alternative grounds which have not been briefed by the
parties. Importantly, the court states, "other than for jurisdictional reasons the court of
appeals should not normally search the record for unargued and unbriefed reasons to
reverse a district court judgment." Id. at ^|22 (emphasis added) (internal quotations
omitted).
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issue in this appeal—did Mr. Ford claim that "the alleged defect is jurisdictional." (R.
47.)
Even assuming Judge Medley had considered Mr. Ford's third petition as raising a
jurisdictional challenge, the challenge stemmed from an unconstitutional delegation, not a
violation of article I, section 13. In the district court, the State recognized both (i) that the
third petition presented only an argument concerning "an unconstitutional delegation of
judicial authority" and (ii) that Mr. Ford's current article I, section 13 claim was not
raised in the third petition: Mr. "Ford did not include his present claim in this third
petition." (R. 45, 107.)
The State also argued below that the issue concerning whether "the commissioner
lacked authority to preside at his preliminary hearing because allowing her to do so was
an unconstitutional delegation of a core judicial function" had been raised by Mr. Ford
c

Tf|or the first time in his Opposition Memorandum." (R. 130 (emphasis added).) The

State went so far as to argue that Mr. Ford had to "amend his petition" before the district
court could consider the unconstitutional delegation claim. (R. 130.) If the
unconstitutional delegation claim was raised for the first time in the opposition
memorandum, then it could not be identical to any of the claims originally raised in the
petition, including the article I, section 13 claim. Importantly, it is not the article I,
section 13 claim, but what the State construed as the "newly raised" unconstitutional
delegation claim, that the State asserts is "the identical claim that Ford litigated and lost
in his third petition." (R. 130 & n. 3.)
Mr. Ford disputes that Judge Medley adjudicated any jurisdictional claims.
However, insofar as this Court concludes that Judge Medley did implicitly address a
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jurisdictional challenge when he ruled the petition was procedurally barred, and that, this
Court then implicitly ruled on the same issue, these conclusions would have the potential
to affect only Mr. Ford's unconstitutional delegation claim, not his article I, section 13
claim, and not to preclude addressing the merits of the claim: "Protection of life and
liberty from unconstitutional procedures is of greater importance than is res judicata.5'10
Hurst v.Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035, 1036 (Utah 1989) ("a procedural default is not
always determinative of a collateral attack on a conviction where it is alleged that the trial
was not conducted . . . in harmony with constitution standards").
Utah's common law exceptions to procedural bars survive enactment of the
PCRA. Gardner v. Galetka, 2007 UT 3, ^|21, 151 P.3d 968. Under the common law,
courts could reach the merits of successive petitions otherwise procedurally barred upon a
showing of good cause. Candelario v. Cook, 789 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 1990) (providing a
non-exhaustive list of what constitutes good cause or unusual circumstances). And good
cause exists here because (as demonstrated in section III of this brief), after Mr. Ford's
third petition was dismissed as procedurally barred, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the
scope of the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation in Jones v. Utah Bd. of Pardons &
Parole, 2004 UT 53, 94 P.3d 283, a clarification that now makes clear that the

10

The State argues that "Ford was not entitled to raise the jurisdictional challenge in
successive petitions until he found a post-conviction court that agreed with him. (First
Br. at 11.) In fact, this is precisely what the writ of habeas corpus entitles a prisoner to
do: "By the common law of England it is the right of any imprisoned person to apply
successively to every tribunal competent to issue a writ of habeas corpus, and each
tribunal must determine such an application upon its merits unfettered by the decision of
any other tribunal of coordinate jurisdiction, even if the grounds urged are exactly the
same." Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 n.4 (Utah 1989) (quoting Eshugbavi Eleko v.
Nigeria [1928] AC (Eng) 459- PC. Rex v. Gee Dew (1924) 33 BC 524, [1924] 3 DLR
153.)
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legislature's delegation ofjudicial power to court commissioners violates article V,
section 1 and article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. Thus, the "ends of justice
would be served" by addressing the merits here. Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1037.
Mr. Ford could not have anticipated the court's clarification of this doctrine when
he filed his prose third petition, and it would be fundamentally unfair to preclude review
of the merits of any of his claims, all of which raise serious constitutional violations that
deserve resolution on the merits. As the Utah Supreme Court recently recognized, "no
statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition," as "proper
consideration of meritorious claims raised in a habeas petition will always be in the
interests of justice." Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah 1998). The Court should
address the merits.
II.

Mr. Ford Was Denied His Right to Preliminary Hearing Under Article I,
Section 13, and Therefore, the Original Trial Court Never Obtained Subject
Matter Jurisdiction to Try Mr. Ford for Possession of a Dangerous Weapon
Under article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution, Mr. Ford was entitled to a

preliminary hearing before a "magistrate." The Utah Supreme Court has explained that
the Utah Constitution does not provide prosecutors unfettered discretion. The court has
noted that "courts have had occasion to scrutinize the exercise of the broad discretion
accorded prosecutors, and that scrutiny has revealed that the prosecutor's good faith is a
fragile protection for the accused." State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986). A
preliminary hearing by a magistrate provides a check on such abuses.
As the original definition of the word "magistrate" demonstrates, a preliminary
hearing must be conducted by a member of the judicial branch, something the State
concedes did not occur in Mr. Ford's case. Therefore, the prosecutor did not have the
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authority to bring Mr. Ford to trial and the original trial court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction to try Mr. Ford. As the district court has correctly concluded, Mr. Ford's
conviction and sentence are void.
In the first opening brief, the State does not deny either that a preliminary hearing
is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a trial court obtaining subject matter jurisdiction or that
Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing was not conducted by a member of the judicial branch.
Instead, the State argues that the article I, section 13 right to preliminary hearing by
"magistrate" does not require a preliminary hearing by a member of the judicial branch.
The historical context in which article I, section 13 was enacted and interpreted by early
courts demonstrates otherwise.
A.

The Origins of the Preliminary Hearing and Its Historical Significance
as a Check on Prosecutorial Discretion

The right to a preliminary hearing is a "substantial" right, deeply-rooted in the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence. State v. Pay, 45 Utah 411, 422, 146 P.300,
305 (Utah 1915). In response to executive branch abuses, the Magna Carta enshrined the
requirement that before citizens can be forced to endure a felony trial, the prosecuting
executive must show an independent judicial body—the grand jury—that probable cause
exists to believe the crime was committed.11 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521
(1884); William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 305.

11

The right to indictment by grand jury has always been a substantial right. As
Blackstone explained, while a grand jury only finds "whether there be sufficient cause to
call upon the party to answer [the King's charge, a] grand jury however ought to be
thoroughly persuaded of the truth of an indictment, so far as their evidence goes; and not
to rest satisfied merely with remote probabilities: a doctrine, that might be applied to
very oppressive purposes." William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 300.
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While misdemeanors could be prosecuted by information, even this practice was
abused by the Crown. As William Blackstone explained, prosecutions by information
"subjected the prosecutor to no costs, though on trial they proved to be groundless. This
oppressive use of them, in the times preceding the [Glorious Revolution, occasioned a
struggle," a struggle that resulted in prosecution by information being curtailed. William
Blackstone, 4 Commentaries, 307, 305. To stop the abuses, a new law required "that the
clerk of the crown shall not file any information without express direction from the court
of the king's bench." Id. (emphasis added). As the Utah Supreme Court has recognized,
in England preliminary examinations of misdemeanor charges were held before a Justice
of the Peace to permit a judicial determination that a trial is warranted. Utah v.
Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 784 n.20 (Utah 1980).12
In the late nineteenth century, states began experimenting with a substitute to the
use of grand juries in felony cases by permitting the showing of probable cause to be
made at a preliminary hearing before a judicial officer instead of a full grand jury. In
1884, the United States Supreme Court held that preliminary hearings before a judicial
officer provided adequate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and for that
reason refused to incorporate against the states the Fifth Amendment grand jury
requirement. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884).
After Hurtado, a number of state courts also determined that a right to preliminary
hearing was an adequate substitute for the right to grand jury, but did so while expressly
recognizing that the hearing must be conducted by a member of the judicial branch. For
F. Maitland, Justice and Police 129 (1885) (The "preliminary examination of accused
persons had gradually assumed a very judicial form."). Numerous other sources have
also noted the historical importance of the preliminary hearing.
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example, in 1891 the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a preliminary hearing is an
adequate "check upon hasty, ill-advised and malicious criminal prosecutions" because the
examination process was "well understood" to be "a proceeding before a regularly
constituted court or judicial magistrate in which the accused has the right to be present
and hear all the witnesses, participate in their examination, and be heard also in his own
behalf." In re Dolph, 17 Colo. 35, 28 P. 470, 471 (1891) (emphasis added).
The Wyoming Supreme Court reached the same conclusion after similarly noting
that a preliminary examination includes, among other things, "an investigation by a
judicial officer, a justice of the peace, of the accusation, where the accused may face his
accusers and have an opportunity to establish his defense." In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 329, 40
P. 520, 522 (1895) (emphasis added). These cases confirm that at the time Utah became
a state the requirement that preliminary hearings be conducted by a member of the
independent judiciary—as a check on otherwise unfettered prosecutorial discretion—
remained a substantive part of the right to preliminary hearing.
B.

Utah Law Requires that the Preliminary Hearing Be Conducted By a
Magistrate, a Member of the Judicial Branch of Government

A year after Boulter, the right to preliminary hearing made its way into article I,
section 13 of the Utah Constitution, as did the requirement that such hearings be
conducted by a member of the judiciary, a magistrate. Specifically, article 1, section 13
provides: "Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be
prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment,
with or without such examination and commitment." Utah Const, art. I, § 13.
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Although the word "magistrate" is not defined in the Utah Constitution, Utah
courts have recognized that the word "had a very definite and concrete meaning" at the
time of statehood. State v. Mclntrye, 92 Utah 177, 183; 66 P.3d 879, 881 (Utah 1937).
A "magistrate" was defined as "an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest
of a person charged with a public offense."13 Id (citing Comp. Laws Utah 1917 § 8677;
Rev. Stat. Utah § 105-10-4 (1933)) see also Rev. Stat. Utah § 4607 (1898). Early statutes
defined "magistrate" as including (i) justices of the supreme court; (ii) judges of the
district courts; and (Hi) justices of the peace.14 Rev. Stat. Utah § 4608 (1898); Comp.
Laws Utah 1917, § 8678. In short, at the time article I, section 13 was enacted, it was
well understood that "the conducting of preliminary hearings . . . , by a court or
magistrate, is the exercise of judicial power." State v. Shockley, 80 P. 865, 876 (Utah
1905) (Bartch, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
The State suggests that the Utah Supreme Court recently ignored this history and
recognized (in dicta) that a magistrate conducting a preliminary hearing could include
someone not a member of the judiciary. (First Br. at 16-17.) The State cites State v.
Humphrey, in which the court addressed the question of whether a criminal defendant
may appeal a defect in a preliminary hearing without first seeking review from the trial
court. 823 P.2d 464, 465-8 (Utah 1991). Under the statutes at the time, the question
13

As the Utah Supreme Court recently recognized, even the issuance of a search warrant
is a "core judicial function," a phrase used in separation of powers analysis but
nonetheless corroborative of the fact that preliminary hearings must be conducted by
judicial officers. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). Also corroborative is
the fact that the probable cause standard is identical for an arrest warrant and for a
bindover order. State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^18, 137 P.3d 787.
14
Later, in 1933, judges of the old city courts were added as permissible magistrates.
Rev. Stat. Utah § 105-10-5 (1933). These judges also were members of the judiciary.
6471112

26

hinged upon whether the magistrate in a preliminary hearing was a "court of record,"
because, if it had been a court of record, then a direct appeal from its bindover order
would have been permitted. Id at 468. The distinct question of whether magistrates
must be members of the judicial branch was not before the court, as demonstrated by the
court's actual holding: "Because magistrates are not courts of record when they conduct
preliminary hearings and issue bindover orders, under the current jurisdictional statutes
their orders are not immediately appealable." Id,
The State asserts that Humphrey stands for the proposition that "a judge serving as
a magistrate at a preliminary hearing is not exercising his judicial authority." (First Br. at
17.) The language the State quotes from Humphrey in support of its assertion makes an
entirely different point: "judges, 'when sitting as magistrates have the jurisdiction and
powers conferred by law upon magistrates and not those that pertain to their respective
judicial offices.'" (First Br. at 17 (quoting Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 467).) The quoted
language merely states that judges serving as magistrates do not carry all aspects of "their
respective judicial offices" to the task of conducting a preliminary hearing. It does not
say that magistrates need not be judicial officers.15
Nor could it, as the Utah Supreme Court also recognizes that magistrates enter
final, appealable judgments after a preliminary hearing when they dismiss an information
15

This is confirmed by the case from which the language the State quotes in Humphreys
originated, Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325, 1327 (Utah 1977). Morris, much like
Humphrey, held that a "city judge, acting not as a city judge with jurisdiction over the
offense, but as a magistrate,... did not have the power to dismiss the accusatory
pleading brought before him for the purpose of preliminary examination." Id Again,
this has nothing to do with whether the person conducting preliminary hearing must be a
member of the judicial branch. If it did, however, Morris recognized that the "office of
magistrate" is conferred upon individuals "who exercise judicial powers." Id.
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for lack of probable cause. State v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53, 54-55 (Utah 1994). In the first
opening brief, the State defines judicial authority as the authority to enter final
judgments, something magistrates do under Jaeger. (First Br. at 17-18.) Therefore, under
the State's own logic, magistrates in preliminary hearings are exercising judicial
authority. While Humphery did not address the question of whether someone not a
member of the judiciary may conduct preliminary hearings, Jaeger confirms that the
answer is "no."
The State also argues that the commissioner presiding over Mr. Ford's preliminary
hearing had authority to do so under Utah Code section 77-1-3 (1993), which defined
"magistrate" to include court commissioners. (First Br. at 19.) Plainly, a statute cannot
alter the content of article I, section 13. Nor does the State suggest it could. Instead, the
State recognizes that its statutory argument depends entirely upon its assertion that
"[magistrates presiding at preliminary hearings are not exercising 'judicial authority.'"
(First Br. at 21.) For reasons set forth previously, this assertion is incorrect. In the end,
the State's argument demonstrates that commissioners could not exercise "judicial
authority" because such authority had not been "expressly provided to them by the
Judicial Council," a prerequisite to anyone exercising judicial powers. (First Br. at 21.)
The State's final argument is that "the identity of the person officiating at a
hearing is not integral to the court's jurisdiction." (First Br. at 8.) The State explains that
the particular commissioner who conducted Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing had adequate
qualifications because "only lawyers with criminal law experience could serve as
commissioners determining whether there was probable cause." (First Br. at 22, 29.)
This argument demonstrates the problem with adopting criteria other than the long-
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standing requirement that a member of the judiciary must preside over preliminary
hearings. The State's suggested alternative criteria of any lawyer with criminal law
experience—which would include every prosecutor,16 even the Attorney General—has
been rejected by the United States Supreme Court in similar circumstances.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971), New Hampshire had
authorized its Attorney General to make a constitutionally required probable cause
determination; in this case, for a search warrant. New Hampshire argued that (i) its
Attorney General, who had been authorized as a "justice of the peace to issue warrants
under then-existing state law, did in fact act as a 'neutral and detached magistrate5" and
(ii) any error was harmless because there was undisputedly probable cause to issue the
warrant. Id at 450. The court rejected both arguments. The court first rejected the
contention that the Attorney General had been authorized to issue warrants and had acted
impartially, holding that "there could hardly be a more appropriate setting than this for a
perse rule of disqualification rather than a case-by-case evaluation of all the
circumstances." Id. The Court then rejected the harmless error argument, holding that
even though there was probable cause, "[s]ince he was not the neutral and detached
magistrate required by the Constitution, the search stands on no firmer ground than if
there had been no warrant at all." Id at 453.
Similarly, there is no reason for this Court to recognize anything other than the per
se rule that only members of the judiciary may conduct preliminary hearings under article
I, section 13, a requirement that has been recognized since Utah became a state. Because
16

Presumably, a prosecutor has already determined there is probable cause before filing
charges, so without additional criteria—such as membership in the judicial branch of
government—would render the right to preliminary hearing a nullity.
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the commissioner who conducted Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing was not a member of
the judicial branch, Mr. Ford was denied the preliminary hearing guaranteed under article
I, section 13.
C.

A Magistrate Must Bind Over a Defendant on Each Charge Before a
District Court May Obtain Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Mr. Ford was convicted of possession of a dangerous weapon, a charge that was
never presented to a magistrate. Therefore, the prosecutor never obtained the authority to
prosecute, and the original trial court never obtained subject matter jurisdiction to try,
Mr. Ford on that charge. The State concedes that "a preliminary hearing and bindover
are 'essential to a court's jurisdiction over a felony,' and that a district court may 'try a
defendant [only] on the specific charge that is bound over.'" (First Br. at 22 (citation
omitted) (alteration in original).) While the State maintains that it may dispute that an
article I, section 13 hearing is a jurisdictional prerequisite "in future cases," it candidly
admits that it may not do so in this case because it did not raise the argument below.
(First Br. at 23 n. 8.)
The existing precedent demonstrates not only that the failure of the prosecutor to
present the possession charge to "examination and commitment by a magistrate"
precluded the original trial court from obtaining subject matter jurisdiction, but also that
the failure to provide an article I, section 13 hearing may be raised at any time. Under
Utah law, where a charge is not first presented to a magistrate, the trial court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to try a defendant, even if there is ample evidence to support the
charge. State v. Nelson, 52 Utah 617, 176 P. 860, 863 (1918) ("Where a complaint
before an examining magistrate charges a certain offense, the defendant cannot be held to
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answer for any other not involved within it, notwithstanding the evidence before the
magistrate may establish another offense."); see also State v. Jensen, 34 Utah 166, 96 P.
1085, 1087 (1908) (holding defendant could not be tried for offense distinct from the one
upon which he had preliminary hearing).
Because identity of the person who may determine probable cause is a substantial
part of the right to a preliminary hearing, presentment to the wrong entity precludes
jurisdiction. In 1899, the Utah Supreme Court held that presentment to a magistrate
under article I, section 13 could not substitute for presentment to a grand jury, where the
alleged crime was committed before Utah became a state and therefore before article I,
section 13. State v. Rock, 57 P. 532, 532 (1899). Even though the Utah Constitution
then recognized that felony charges could be presented to a magistrate and even though
there was no suggestion that the State had not demonstrated probable cause, the Utah
Supreme Court held that "the prosecuting attorney had no authority to file the
information."17 Id. at 45. As here, the State did not have the authority "to take from the
accused a constitutional right which belonged to him when the offense was committed."18
Id
After Utah became a state, it became equally essential that the charge be presented
to "a magistrate having jurisdiction to investigate the charge and determine if there is
probable cause," which, as demonstrated above, requires that the preliminary hearing be
17

In contrast, when the wrong judicial officer presides over a preliminary hearing, the
defect is not jurisdictional, as the right to preliminary hearing by magistrate is fulfilled.
State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 142 (Utah 1989) (bindover by magistrate in wrong county
not jurisdictional).
1R

This case is of particular note because the magistrate had de facto authority to conduct
the preliminary hearing, something the State repeatedly asserts is sufficient to cure any
jurisdictional defect in this case, an assertion discussed in Part III. (First Br. at 24-27.)
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conducted by a member of the judiciary. State v. Freeman, 71 P.2d 196, 199 (Utah 1937)
(emphasis added). The Court was correct when it recently recognized that "Utah has
long recognized that a preliminary hearing is essential to a court's jurisdiction over a
felony," as a "district court has jurisdiction only to try a defendant on the specific charge
that is bound over." State v. Marshall 2005 UT App 269, * 1-2, 2005 Utah App. LEXIS
260; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 5(a) & 7(i)(2) (requiring felony information to be filed
before a magistrate before a bindover may be issued and jurisdiction acquired by district
court). Therefore, under settled Utah law, unless a charge is first presented for
"examination and commitment by a magistrate," a prosecutor lacks authority to file an
information containing that charge and the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
to try the accused of that charge.
An accused can only waive the right to challenge the State's failure to present each
charge to a magistrate by expressly waiving the right to preliminary hearing. Article I,
section 13 provides that "the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of
the State." Utah Const, art. I, § 13. Unsurprisingly, the Utah Supreme Court had held
that once a defendant expressly waives the right to preliminary hearing, he cannot then
complain that the charges against him were not first presented to a magistrate. State v.
Freeman, 71 P.2d 196 (Utah 1937); United States v. Eldregde, 13 P. 673, 676 (Utah
1887). Absent an express waiver of the right to preliminary hearing, however, the failure
to present a charge to a magistrate is jurisdictional and therefore not waivable.19 In this
case, it is undisputed that Mr. Ford did not waive his right to preliminary hearing.
19

A possible exception is when a defendant pleads guilty to the crime. Rule 10(c) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: "Any defect or irregularity in or want or
absence of any proceeding provided for by statute or these rules prior to arraignment shall
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A number of non-jurisdictional defects in a preliminary hearing may be implicitly
waived if not raised at the time the defendant enters an initial plea. Examples include
(i) the accused does not have counsel,20 (ii) the accused is not permitted to confront
witnesses, or (iii) the evidence does not support probable cause.

However, Mr. Ford

does not allege any of these defects here.
Where a defendant does not waive his right to have each charge against him first
presented to a magistrate, and yet the State fails to do so, the trial court cannot obtain
subject matter jurisdiction to try the defendant, and therefore, any beyond-a-reasonabledoubt conviction must be vacated. State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Utah 1988)
(reversing conviction when defendant was convicted of criminal episode for which he
had not been bound over); State v. Pettit 93 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah 1939) (same); State v.
Nelson, 176 P. 860 (Utah 1918) (same).
The failure to provide "examination and commitment by magistrate" for each
charge cannot be waived, as it can be raised for the first time on appeal, State v. Hoben,
102 P. 1000 (Utah 1909), and can be raised in a habeas petition. Winnovich v. Emery, 93
P. 988, 994 (Utah 1908). As the court explained in Emery, "on habeas corpus
proceedings," if a court determines that "there was no preliminary examination or hearing
be specifically and expressly objected to before a plea of guilty is entered or the same is
waived." However, even this principal is unclear when a challenge involves a trial
court's jurisdiction. State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^[15, 167 P.3d 1046 (guilty plea
waives right to challenge all "nonjurisdictional" defects in the preliminary hearing).
20
Crouch v. State, 467 P.2d 43, 44 (Utah 1970) (voluntary waiver of counsel at
preliminary hearing cannot be grounds for setting aside a conviction on appeal).
21
Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61 at YP 8-19 (preliminary hearing valid despite defendant's
inability to confront witnesses);
22
State v. Quas, 837 P.2d 565 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing cases that concern evidentiary
defects).
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by the magistrate, the accused should be discharged." Id The court recognized that such
a jurisdictional defect exists unless the "magistrate had jurisdiction of the subject-matter
and of the person of the accused." Id
This rule under article I, section 13 is consistent with the general principal that a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. The court recently
explained that "when subject matter [jurisdiction] does not exist, neither the parties nor
the court can do anything to fill that void." Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199,1J12, 29
P.3d 13; see also Peterson v. Utah Bd. Of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1995)
("subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that can and should be addressed sua sponte when
jurisdiction is questionable").
Because Mr. Ford did not waive his right to preliminary hearing by magistrate and
a magistrate did not "examine" the possession of a dangerous weapon charge, the
prosecutor never obtained the authority to file an information in the original trial court,
and the original trial court never obtained subject matter jurisdiction to try Mr. Ford.
Because the original trial court lacked jurisdiction, the district court in this case correctly
vacated Mr. Ford's sentence. This Court should affirm.
III.

The Commissioner's Exercise of the Authority to Conduct Mr. Ford's
Preliminary Hearing Resulted From an Unconstitutional Delegation of a Core
Judicial Function
Mr. Ford's petition raises an independent basis to affirm the district court's order

vacating his conviction and sentence. Specifically, Mr. Ford argues that the legislature

23

At times, the State suggests that this principle applies only when reviewing the
jurisdiction of the presiding court. (First Br. at 13.) This cannot be correct. As
explained previously, the traditional use of habeas petitions was to challenge an original
trial court's jurisdiction in a separate proceeding.
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unconstitutionally delegated to a commissioner the judicial authority to conduct
preliminary hearings, a violation of article V, section 1 and article VIII, section 1. As the
State recognizes in its first opening brief, the legislature authorized commissioners to
conduct preliminary hearings, but the Judicial Council did not. (First Br. at 20-21.) The
State argues that this does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation because
(i) conducting a preliminary hearing is not a core judicial function and only core judicial
functions cannot be delegated to non-judicial officers; and (ii) the commissioner
presiding over Mr. Ford's hearing had de facto judicial authority, and therefore, her
actions did not strip the original trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. (First Br. at 2427.)
Both arguments fail. Under current case law discussing unconstitutional
delegation doctrine, conducting a preliminary hearing is a core judicial function because
(i) a magistrate's decision to bindover an accused is immediately enforceable and (ii) a
magistrate's refusal to bindover constitutes a final judgment. In addition, assuming the
commissioner conducting Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing was exercising de facto judicial
authority, the doctrine does not apply to preclude affording relief to Mr. Ford. Instead,
non-delegation cases provide that the first citizen to raise a particular unconstitutional
delegation claim—in this case, Mr. Ford—may benefit from having raised it regardless of
whether there was de facto authority. In other words, the doctrine of de facto authority
does not affect Mr. Ford's petition.
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A.

Conducting a Preliminary Hearing is a Core Judicial Function That
Commissioners Lack Authority to Perform

For the reasons discussed previously in Section II, a person conducting a
preliminary hearing under article I, section 13 must be a member of the independent
judiciary. Under the non-delegation doctrine, conducting a preliminary hearing is also a
core judicial function.
The Utah Supreme Court explained what constitute core judicial functions in Salt
Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994). In Ohms, the court held that a court
commissioner lacks the required judicial authority in misdemeanor cases to enter a final
judgment of conviction and impose sentence, something the court described as a "core
judicial function." Id at 851. The court therefore vacated the conviction and sentence
because the delegation of judicial power was unconstitutional. Id. at 855.
The Ohms court explained that core judicial functions include (i) "the power to
hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation,"
(ii) "the authority to hear and determine justiciable controversies," (iii) "the authority to
enforce any valid judgment, decree or order," and (iv) "all powers that are necessary to
protect the fundamental integrity of the judicial branch." Id. at 849. In contrast, core
judicial functions do not include functions that are generally designed merely to "assist"
courts, "such as conducting fact finding hearings, holding pretrial conferences, and
making recommendations to judges." Id, at 851 n.17. The Ohms court held that because
commissioners then-presiding over misdemeanor trials entered final judgments, they
were exercising a core judicial function.
Four years later, the Utah Supreme Court explained the doctrine further in State v.
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998). In Thomas, the court held that issuing a search
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warrant is also a core judicial function that commissioners may not perform. The court
based its holding on the following considerations. First, a search warrant is an
enforceable order. Id at 303. Second, a search warrant relates to one of "the most
fundamental and cherished rights we possess," namely to be free from unreasonable
search as seizures. Id. at 303. Third, in issuing a search warrant a commissioner "did not
recommend to the judge that the warrant be issued but rather issued it herself." Id. at
304. Fourth, the issuance of a search warrant is not reviewable by a judge. Id Finally,
"while issuing a search warrant does not rise to the level of finality as entering judgment
and imposing sentence, as was disallowed in Ohms, it is sufficiently final to establish it
as a core judicial function." Id.
The same five considerations apply to orders issued by magistrates in preliminary
hearings. First, a bindover order is immediately enforceable, as no further judicial
determination is necessary to bindover the accused. And when a magistrate refuses to
bindover, the State is precluded from proceeding to trial, or even from re-presenting the
same charges unless new evidence emerges. State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 645 (Utah
1986). A magistrate's orders, like search warrants, are immediately enforceable.
Second, a bindover order also relates to one of our most cherished rights. The
right to a preliminary hearing in article I, section 13 substitutes for the ancient right to
indictment by grand jury, and affords citizens protection against "the 'substantial
degradation and expense' attendant to a criminal trial." Id at 646. The judicial check on
prosecutorial discretion is at least as cherished as the judicial check on the authority of
the executive branch to search citizens' homes.
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Third, a bindover order is not a mere recommendation. The magistrate enters the
bindover order, and the accused is boundover. The magistrate does not recommend to the
district court that it enter the bindover order.
Fourth, while a bindover order—like the validity of a search warrant—is later
reviewable by a trial court, the court does not review the bindover order de novo, as it
would an order issued in a small claims court or justice court. Because bindover orders
involve a "magistrate's factual findings," they "require some deference by a reviewing
court." State v. Wodskow, 896 P.2d 29, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The same deference to
bindover orders is afforded by appellate courts. State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^26, 137
P.3d 787 ("in reviewing a magistrate's bindover decision, an appellate court should
afford the decision limited deference").
Finally, magistrates conducting preliminary hearings enter final orders, not just
"sufficiently final" orders, as the Thomas court described search warrants. The Utah
Supreme Court has held that when a magistrate refuses to bindover an accused and
instead dismisses the information, the magistrate's order—unlike a search warrant—is
final and appealable. State v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1994). Therefore, a
commissioner conducting a preliminary hearing does enter final judgments, which is
certainly "sufficiently final to establish it as a core judicial function." Thomas, 961 P.2d
at 304. Under the rule announced in Thomas, conducting a preliminary hearing is a core
judicial function that a non-judicial officer, such as a commissioner, may not perform.
This result was confirmed by Jones v. Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, 94
P.3d 283, in which the Utah Supreme Court held that when the Board of Pardons issues
"retaking warrants," which are similar to arrest warrants, it does not exercise a core
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judicial function. The court explained that "Board members, unlike commissioners, do
not serve in 'courts of record,' a characteristic that defined the realm of both Ohms and
Thomas." Id. at ^[16. Later, the court reiterated that unlike the Board, justice court
judges, and judges pro tempore, "commissioners are assigned to courts of record and are
therefore ineligible to perform 'core judicial functions' under Ohms and Thomas." Id. at
Tfl7 n.l. After Jones, then, what makes commissioners ineligible to perform core judicial
functions is that they serve in courts of record.
When commissioners act as magistrates in presiding over preliminary hearings,
they also are serving in courts of record. The State cites State v. Humphery, 823 P.2d
464 (Utah 1991) for the proposition that bindover orders are not immediately appealable,
and therefore, magistrates presiding over preliminary hearings are not serving on courts
of record. (First Br. at 17.) While this is a possible interpretation of Humphery, this
interpretation has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. Three years after Humphery
in State v. Jaeger, the court held that while a magistrate's bindover order is not final and
immediately appealable, when a magistrate declines to bindover and enters an order
dismissing the information, that order is "a final judgment of dismissal" and "a final
adjudicative decision." 886 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1994). The court therefore recognized in
Jaeger that magistrates presiding over preliminary hearings do enter final judgments,
which makes them courts of record under the definition in Jones.24 If a magistrate serves

24

In Jaeger, the court discusses the concept of a judge wearing two hats, one for his
"judicial" functions and one for his "nonadjudicative" functions. 886 P.2d at 54 n.2.
This distinction makes some sense when discussing the right to an immediate appeal
because there is nothing inconsistent with allowing an immediate appeal from the refusal
to bindover, but not allowing one from the decision to bindover. However, this
distinction cannot work similarly in the non-delegation setting. If a magistrate must
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on a court of record when he issues search warrants then he also serves on a court of
record when he declines to bindover an accused for trial.
Presiding over a preliminary hearing is a core judicial function that commissioners
may not perform under the criteria set forth in Thomas and the court-of-record
requirement set forth in Jones. Because presiding over a preliminary hearing is a core
judicial function, a court commissioner could not perform that function unless she could
exercise judicial authority, authority the State recognizes court commissioners lacked.
Therefore, when the legislature delegated the authority to serve as magistrates to
commissioners, the delegation was unconstitutional under article V, section 1 and article
VII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
B.

A Commissioner Conducting a Preliminary Hearing Also Violates
Separation of Powers

Even if conducting a preliminary hearing were not a core judicial function, having
a non-judicial officer conduct a preliminary hearing would still violate the Utah
Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court uses a separate analytical model to determine
whether a legislative grant of judicial power violates the separation of powers, even
where no core judicial function is involved. A violation occurs where (i) the actors are
"charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of the [other] branches;"
(ii) "the function .. . appertain^] to another branch of government;" and (iii) the
constitution does not expressly permit the delegation. In re Young, 1999 UT 6, ^[8, 976
P.2d581.

exercise any judicial authority in a preliminary hearing, then only one with judicial
authority can serve as a magistrate.
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All three criteria are satisfied here. First, commissioners do exercise powers
properly belonging to the judiciary, such as determining whether there is probable cause
to bindover and entering final judgments by dismissing informations.
Second, determining probable cause and dismissing informations appertain to the
judicial branch. As explained above, article I, section 13 requires that judicial
magistrates conduct preliminary hearings. The best evidence of this is that "magistrate"
was originally defined as "an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a
person charged with a public offense," a core judicial function. State v. Mclntrye, 92
Utah 177, 183; 66 P.3d 879, 881 (Utah 1937) (citing Comp. Laws Utah 1917 § 8677;
Rev. Stat. Utah § 105-10-4 (1933)) see also Rev. Stat. Utah § 4607. Article I, section 13
requires that a preliminary hearing be conducted by a magistrate, and a magistrate is a
judicial officer.
Third, no constitutional provision expressly permits anyone other than a member
of the judiciary to perform these functions. Therefore, when the commissioner presided
over Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing, it also violated separation of powers, regardless of
whether conducting a preliminary hearing is a core judicial function (which it is).
C.

Even if the Commissioner Had De Facto Authority, Mr. Ford's
Conviction Nonetheless Should Have Been Vacated

The State argues that even if the commissioner had no authority to preside over
Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing, she had de facto judicial authority, which is sufficient to
cure any jurisdictional defects.25 (First Br. at 26-27.) Even if the State is correct,
25

This if far from obvious, as Mr. Ford is not challenging the original trial court's subject
matter jurisdiction by challenging the authority of the original trial judge. Instead, he is
challenging the original trial court's jurisdiction because the prosecutor lacked the
authority to file the information. The reason the prosecutor lacked such authority is
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Mr. Ford would still be entitled to have his conviction vacated, just as the district court
ordered. As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Thomas, the de facto authority
doctrine does not apply to the first citizen to bring a jurisdictional defect to the court's
attention. 961 P.2d at 302. Therefore, the doctrine of de facto authority cannot preclude
affording habeas relief to Mr. Ford. This Court should affirm the order vacating Mr.
Ford's conviction and sentence.
IV.

Mr. Ford Has the Right to Paid Counsel to Defend Against the State's Use of
the Judicial Process to Obtain the Legal Authority to Imprison Him
The State's second opening brief addresses the district court's ruling on remand

that Mr. Ford is entitled to paid counsel under the Indigent Defense Act, the Utah
Constitution, and the United States Constitution. After the district court granted
Mr. Ford's pro se habeas petition and vacated his sentence, the State had no legal basis to
deprive Mr. Ford of his liberty. The district court provided the State two avenues for
dealing with Mr. Ford. First, it could have accepted the district court's proffered
opportunity to re-try Mr. Ford, if it could first establish probable cause in a preliminary
hearing before a magistrate. (R. 240.) Second, the State could have dropped the case
because Mr. Ford had already spent 13 years in prison for possession of a weapon.
The State chose to pursue a third route—to prosecute this appeal and to seek the
authority to send Mr. Ford back to prison. Had the State sought to send Mr. Ford back to
prison in a new trial, then Mr. Ford unquestionably would have had the right to paid legal
representation. As demonstrated below, that right to counsel cannot be extinguished

because the court commissioner—as a non-judicial officer—lacked authority to preside
over the preliminary hearing. The commissioner's de facto authority cannot cure the
jurisdictional defect in the original trial court.
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simply because the State has chosen to deprive Mr. Ford of the same liberty through an
appellate court instead of a trial court.
From the outset, it is worth noting the scope of the right to counsel at issue in this
appeal. The State is correct that the right at issue here concerns very narrow
circumstances in which (i) a district court already has granted a habeas petition (or
petition for post-conviction relief); (ii) in granting the petition, the court has vacated the
legal basis of confinement; and (iii) the State has decided to appeal the district court's
ruling in an effort to regain the legal basis of confinement. (Second Br. at 2.) Mr. Ford
disagrees with the State that a successful petitioner also must have been released from
prison to qualify for the right to counsel recognized by the district court; however, the
Court need not resolve this question, as Mr. Ford, in fact, is currently free.
Normally, Mr. Ford would address the statutory argument first, as it is a
prerequisite to reaching constitutional issues. However, Mr. Ford agrees with the State's
characterization of the Indigent Defense Act ("IDA") as designed to "bring Utah into
compliance with its federal constitutional obligations." (Second Br. at 5, 21.) For this
reason, Mr. Ford will first outline the constitutional grounds for the right to counsel,
beginning with the federal constitution, which defines the minimum obligation Utah has
to provide counsel to its citizens, through statute or otherwise.
A.

Mr. Ford Has a Federal Constitutional Right to Counsel Because the
State is Employing the Judicial Process to Deprive Mr. Ford of His
Liberty

Mr. Ford is entitled to paid appointed counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel (as incorporated against the states) and the Fourteenth Amendment rights to
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due process and to equal protection require the State to provide Mr. Ford paid counsel on
appeal. The State argues that under the United States Constitution there is no right to
counsel beyond the first appeal of right from a criminal conviction. The case law
indicates otherwise.
1.

Ford Has a Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

A citizen has the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment when a state
employs the judicial process in an attempt to alter the status quo and to deprive the citizen
of his liberty on the ground that the citizen has committed a crime. This is precisely what
the State is attempting to do here. Currently, the State has no legal basis to imprison Mr.
Ford. With its appeal, the State is seeking a legal basis to imprison Mr. Ford for violating
a criminal statute forbidding the possession of a dangerous weapon. Under federal case
law, Mr. Ford has a right to paid counsel to defend against the State's appeal.
The State argues that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only during a
criminal prosecution and the first level of appellate review. (Second Br. at 32-36.) It
buries in a footnote a case that demonstrates otherwise, a case upon which the district
court relied, Blakenship v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 1997). (Second Br. at 35-36
n. 11.) The State correctly notes that under normal circumstances the right to counsel
ends after the first level of appellate review. There is no right to counsel where a
defendant is initiating a discretionary appeal to eliminate the State's legal authority to
imprison the defendant. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "it is
ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who initiates the appellate process, seeking
not to fend off the efforts of the State's prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilt

6471112

44

made by a judge or jury below." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (emphasis
added).
However, under Blankenship, where the defendant prevails in the first level of
appellate review, and the State initiates a discretionary appeal to regain the legal authority
to imprison the defendant, then the defendant does have a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 118 F.3d at 317 (recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to counsel where the
"state, rather than the defendant, has requested and obtained the discretionary review").
Mr. Ford, as an appellee, is no differently positioned than was Mr. Blankenship, also an
appellee. As in Blankenship, the State here is attempting to regain its legal authority to
imprison Mr. Ford. Therefore, Mr. Ford has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
defend against the State's appeal.
The State attempts to distinguish this case from Blankenship by drawing a
distinction between civil from criminal. The State argues that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel does not attach in civil proceedings, and that a habeas proceeding is a civil
proceeding. (Second Br. at 34-35.) However, the distinction between civil and criminal
cannot bear the weight the State places on it.
For example, juvenile proceedings are labeled "civil," and yet the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches because the child is "subjected to the loss of his
liberty." In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1967). This alone demonstrates that the
civil/criminal distinction does not determine the scope of the right to counsel. Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) ("the juvenile has a right to

26

Mr. Ford is not aware of any other case to address a constitutional right to counsel
under these circumstances.
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appointed counsel even though those proceedings may be styled "civil" and not
"criminal").
The State argues that Gault stands only for the "proposition that due process
guarantees counsel to a juvenile facing proceedings that equate to a criminal
prosecution." (Second Br. at 12.) This argument proves the opposite of what the State
supposes. The fact that juvenile proceedings are civil and yet "equate to a criminal
prosecution," as the State recognizes, demonstrates that the civil/criminal distinction is
not relevant to the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In any event, as the
Tenth Circuit has noted when discussing the right to counsel, [i]t would be absurd to
distinguish criminal and civil incarceration; from the perspective of the person
incarcerated, the jail is just as bleak no matter which label is used." Walker v. McLain,
768 F.2d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1985). The distinction between civil proceedings and
criminal proceedings cannot distinguish this case from Blankenship.
The State argues that United States Supreme Court case law demonstrates there is
no federal right to paid counsel in post-conviction proceedings under any circumstances.
(Second Br. at 34.) These cases, however, demonstrate only that there is no right to
counsel for a prisoner challenging the legal basis for confinement. Murray v. Giarratano,
492 U.S. 1, 12 (1989) (no right to counsel to prosecute post-conviction petitions in capital
cases); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (no "right to counsel when mounting
collateral attacks") (emphasis added). These cases do not even address—let alone
govern—the situation here, where Mr. Ford is defending against the State's attempt to
regain the legal basis for confinement.

6471112

46

Because Mr. Ford's conviction and sentence have been vacated, like Mr.
Blankenship, Mr. Ford is no longer employing the judicial process to challenge the legal
basis of his confinement, because no legal basis exists. Instead, the State is employing
the judicial process to reinstate that legal basis so it can send Mr. Ford back to prison to
finish the final 2 years of his 15-year sentence. The cases cited by the State do not deal
with this situation, but Blankenship does. Mr. Ford has a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. This Court should affirm.
2.

Ford Has a Right to Appointed, Paid Counsel Under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

Mr. Ford also has a right to counsel under the due process clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment. If this Court concludes that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not
apply—even though the legal basis the State seeks to send Mr. Ford to prison is a
violation of a criminal statute—then the due process right to counsel does apply. There is
no question that the due process clause applies in civil cases; therefore, the State's
distinction between civil and criminal is not outcome determinative. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at
24 (recognizing right to counsel in hearings to termination parental rights where the
parents' interests are particularly strong and the likelihood of error is particularly high).
The United State Supreme Court weighs the following three factors to determine
whether the due process right to counsel attaches: (i) "the private interests at stake;"
(ii) "the government's interest;" and (iii) "the risk that the procedures used will lead to
erroneous decisions." IdL at 27 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35
(1976)). These factors weigh in favor of Mr. Ford. First, Mr. Ford has a commanding
private interest—his liberty. Second, the government interest in further depriving Mr.
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Ford of his liberty is minimal, as Mr. Ford has already served 13 years of a 15 year
sentence for possession of a weapon. Moreover, the State's interest here should be
aligned with Mr. Ford. Both have an interest in ensuring that citizens are not denied
basic constitutional rights. Finally, there is a substantial risk of an erroneous decision if
citizens in the position of Mr. Ford are not provided with counsel. The issues presented
in the State's appeal are complex, "abtruse, technical [and] unfamiliar" to Mr. Ford, who
has no formal legal training. Id. at 29.
The most analogous cases applying these three elements are those involving the
revocation of probation or parole. In those cases, the State is similarly reasserting the
right to imprison a citizen. Under these circumstances, the right to counsel attaches.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (decision of whether to appoint paid
counsel at probation revocation hearing determined on a case-by-case basis); Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (decision of whether to appoint paid counsel at
parole revocation hearing determined on a case-by-case basis), Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480 (1980) (plurality) (an indigent prisoner is entitled to appointed counsel before being
involuntarily transferred for treatment to a state mental hospital).
Under this line of cases, the district court did not abuse its direction in ruling that
the right to due process requires appointed paid counsel for Mr. Ford to defend against
the State's appeal. Mr. Ford is currently free and faces imprisonment if the State is
successful with its appeal. Mr. Ford's fundamental liberty interest is therefore in
jeopardy. The due process clause requires the appointment of paid counsel for Mr. Ford.
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B.

Mr. Ford Has a Right to Counsel Under the State Constitution Because
the State is Invoking the Judicial Process to Deprive Mr. Ford of His
Liberty

The Utah Constitution also provides Mr. Ford the right to paid counsel. Article I,
section 12 guarantees "[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear to defend in person and by counsel," and article I, section 7 guarantees that "[n]o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Utah
Const, art. I, §§ 7, 12. Much like the right to counsel under the Untied States
Constitution, whether this appeal is considered criminal or civil is irrelevant. If the
State's appeal is "criminal" in nature—because the State seeks to regain the legal
authority to imprison Mr. Ford for violation of a criminal statute—then the article I,
section 12 right to counsel applies. If the State's appeal is "civil" in nature—but
nonetheless involves the State's attempt to obtain the legal authority to deprive Mr. Ford
of his fundamental liberty interest—then article I, section 7 guarantees the right to
counsel. Either way, Mr. Ford has the right to counsel under the Utah Constitution.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the right to counsel under article I,
section 12 in probation revocation hearings. State v. Eichler, 483 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah
1971). In Eichler, the court recognized that—much like petitioners in the post-conviction
setting—one on probation is "not entitled to all of the protections the law affords one
accused of crime in the first instance." Id at 888-89. The court nonetheless held that
because a revocation of probation carried with it the "possibility of changing the
defendant's status from one of being at liberty to one of being in confinement," the right
to counsel under article I, section 12 applied. I d at 889. Importantly, the court held that
the question of whether to appoint counsel under article I, section 12 "could well be left
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to the discretion of the trial judge, with his action subject to review for abuse of
discretion."

Id.

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing paid counsel to Mr.
Ford. Like Mr. Eichler, Mr. Ford is similarly facing the possibility of having his status
changed "from one of being at liberty to one of being in confinement." However, Mr.
Ford's liberty interest is stronger than that of a person on probation, as Mr. Ford's release
is not conditional. The legal basis for confining Mr. Ford has been extinguished entirely.
The State ignores Eichler and focuses on a case it appears to have overruled, Beal
v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 P.2d 624 (1969). (Second Br. at 26.) In Beal decided
two years before Eichler, the court held that the right to counsel does not attach in parole
revocation hearings. The sole dissenting justice in Eichler complained that Beal
governed, but the majority disagreed. Eichler, 483 P.2d at 890 (Ellett, J., dissenting)
("The case of Beal v. Turner is dispositive of the present matter insofar as the need for
counsel is concerned.").
The only other case the State cites—Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1994)—
involves the right to counsel in a parole grant hearing, an entirely different matter.
(Second Br. 27-28.) In parole grant hearings, the prisoner is attempting to gain liberty he
currently lacks; whereas in a parole or probation revocation hearing—like here—the
State is attempting to obtain the right to take that liberty away.28 Tellingly, the Neel court
27

This Court subsequently recognized that insofar as the federal right to counsel is
concerned, whether the right to counsel attaches in a probation revocation hearing is
determined on a case by case basis. State v. Byington, 936 P.2d 1112, 1116 n.3 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997). Here, the district court determined the right to counsel attaches.
In addition, the Neel court focused on the non-adversarial nature of a parole grant
hearing and had "no desire to turn these hearings into adversarial or confrontational
exercises." 886 P.2d at 1103 n.7. The proceedings here are plainly adversarial.
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did not cite to Beal, apparently agreeing that it had been overruled in Eichler. If there
were no distinction between parole grant hearings and parole revocation hearings with
respect to the right to counsel, as the State contends, then Beal would have been
controlling authority and would have been cited as such.
The rule emerging from these cases is that whenever the State is attempting to
regain the right to imprison on the basis of a violation of a criminal statute, the right to
counsel attaches. The fact that this is occurring here in the post-conviction setting is
irrelevant. The Utah Supreme Court has suggested that the right to counsel attaches in
post-conviction proceedings even where the petitioner is attempting to regain his liberty,
but in each instance has declined to resolve the issue expressly. Julian v. State, 966 P.2d
249, 259 (Utah 1998) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) ("defendant should be provided with
paid counsel and one state-financed automatic post-conviction proceeding"); Bruner v.
Carver, 920 P.2dll53, 1158 (Utah 1996) (declining to address the issue because it had
not been briefed independently of the Sixth Amendment issue); Parsons v. Barnes, 871
P.2d 516, 530-31 (Utah 1994) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (stating that post-conviction
proceedings should be considered criminal in some instances). If the right to counsel to
prosecute a post-conviction petition is a close call, then the right to counsel here is not, as
the status quo is that the State lacks any legal basis to confine Mr. Ford. Under these
circumstances, Mr. Ford has an article I, section 12 right to counsel.
The State cites Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, 84 P.3d 1150 for the proposition
that there is no right to counsel in any post-conviction proceedings. (Second Br. at 27.)
However, Hutchings involved the right to counsel in an appeal from a parole revocation
hearing and in prosecuting a petition for post-conviction relief. 2003 UT 52 at f 19. Even

6471112

51

so, it did not analyze the question under the Utah Constitution, and instead provides only
a single cite to federal law, idL at ^[20, something the State later acknowledges. (Second
Br. at 27 n.8.) In addition, Hutchings held that the right-to-counsel claims were
procedurally barred. 2003 UT 52 at f20. Hutchings does not address the issues
presented here.
Insofar as the article I, section 12 right to counsel does not extend in any way to
the post-conviction setting, the right to counsel under the due process clause in article I,
section 7 applies. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that due process may require
counsel in some circumstances similar to those requiring the right to counsel under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017
1029-30, n.13 (Utah 1996). Specifically, the Monson court stated that the due process
right to counsel would attach—even in parole grant hearings—where counsel could assist
with ensuring "accuracy and reliability" in the proceedings. Id at 1030. Here, as
explained previously, counsel is enormously helpful to appellate courts when they review
district court orders granting habeas relief. The State has paid counsel to present its
arguments; and prisoners seeking to maintain the relief they have already been granted
deserve no less.
As the Utah Supreme Court has explained, courts should fashion a post-conviction
remedy whenever required to further "fundamental fairness." Manning v. State, 2005 UT
61, T[30, 122 P.3d 628. Where a district court has ruled that the legal basis of
confinement is void and has therefore vacated the conviction and sentence of a prisoner,
it would be fundamentally unfair to expect the (now former) prisoner to defend the
district court's ruling in this Court pro se.
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The State attempts to avoid this result by arguing that Mr. Ford does not have a
liberty interest because, "if the State succeeds [on appeal], it will result merely in
reinstating the already imposed punishment." (Second Br. at 30.) This analysis,
however, ignores the fact that the right to counsel attaches in probation (and likely
parole) revocation hearings, even though they are merely reinstating an already imposed
punishment. In addition, the district court's order releasing Mr. Ford is certainly final
enough to bestow a liberty interest. If all legal proceedings ended today, Mr. Ford would
remain free because his conviction and sentence have been vacated. That makes Mr.
Ford's liberty interest at least as great as that of a parolee or a defendant on probation,
both of whom still have criminal convictions in place and both of whom are recognized
to have a liberty interest sufficient to trigger a federal right to due process. Article I,
section 7 provides no less protection.
Regardless of whether these proceedings are labeled as "civil" or "criminal,"
Mr. Ford has a right to counsel under the Utah Constitution. This Court should affirm.
C.

Mr. Ford Has a Right to Counsel Under the IDA Because the State is
Invoking the Judicial Process to Deprive Mr. Ford of His Liberty

Mr. Ford also has a statutory right to counsel under the Indigent Defense Act.
Mr. Ford agrees with the State that the IDA is designed to "bring Utah into compliance
with its federal constitution obligations." (Second Br. at 16.) As set forth above, Mr.
Ford does have a federal constitutional right to counsel, and therefore, the IDA should be
read to bring the State into compliance with that obligation.
Consistent with the right to counsel under the United States Constitution, the IDA
requires that legal counsel be provided "for each indigent who faces the substantial
probability of the deprivation of the indigent's liberty." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301 (1).
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This plain language describes precisely what Mr. Ford—an indigent—faces. The State
argues that this language does not apply because it is limited to deprivations of liberty
"that will follow from a criminal conviction." (Second Br. at 13.) However, even this
narrow reading is satisfied here: If the State succeeds on appeal, its legal basis for
sending Mr. Ford to prison is a criminal conviction.
The State next argues that the language does not apply because section 77-32301(6) excludes from the IDA's reach "subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary
writ proceedings." (Second Br. at 14.) However, this appeal is neither a "subsequent
discretionary appeal" nor a "discretionary writ proceeding." This appeal is not
discretionary because the State had a right to appeal and this writ proceeding is no longer
discretionary as to Mr. Ford because the State is the only party that wishes to proceed.
To avoid this problem, the State cites to Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608 (Utah
1994) for the proposition that the statutory right to counsel does not attach when
defending against the State's appeal. (Second Br. at 15.) However, not only was
Gardner a plurality opinion, it also did not address the issue of the right to counsel in the
circumstances presented here, as it involved the right to state-funded post-conviction
experts and investigators. Although the appeal was taken by the State in Gardner,
Gardner was not requesting paid counsel on appeal or for paid investigators for the
appeal. Rather, he argued that when he filed for post-conviction relief, he should have
been entitled to paid investigators. The court determined that, because of the
discretionary nature of the post-conviction petition, Gardner was not entitled to paid
investigators or experts, but that under certain circumstances a post-conviction petitioner
could be entitled to state compensated investigators and experts. Id at 622 & n.5. Again,
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this analysis does not apply to Mr. Ford's request for paid counsel after the State
appealed his successful post-conviction petition. Mr. Ford's participation in this appeal is
in no way discretionary. Thus, Gardner provides no support for the State's position.
The State also attempts to avoid the plain language of the IDA by contending that
the IDA applies only to criminal cases. Mr. Ford will not repeat the arguments made
previously to rebut this contention. It is sufficient to point out that the IDA applies to
juvenile proceedings, which are civil proceedings. The important consideration is
whether the State is attempting to deprive an indigent's liberty by imprisoning him for
having committed a crime. Again, this is precisely what the State seeks to do here.
The State's also attempts to avoid the plain language of the IDA by arguing that a
provision in the Post-Conviction Relief Act governs instead. (Second Br. at 18-19.) The
PCRA provides that a district court may "appoint counsel on a pro bono basis" to
represent a petitioner who files a non-frivolous petition. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a109(1). This section is entirely consistent with the IDA and does not supersede it, as the
State suggests. (Second Br. at 18 n.3.) The PCRA provision addresses the appointment
of counsel for the initial disposition of post-conviction petitions, and the IDA expressly
excludes "discretionary writ proceedings." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301(6). The very
proceedings expressly excluded from the IDA—discretionary writ proceedings—are
those covered by the PCRA.
The Court should read these two statutes as harmonious, not as in conflict with
one another. Board of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, ^|9, 94 P.3d 234 ("We
read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony
with other statutes in the same chapter or related chapters."). The harmonious reading is
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that the PCRA allows the district court to appoint counsel once it determines a postconviction petition is not frivolous; and once the district court grants relief by vacating
the conviction and sentence, then the IDA applies because the indigent person now faces
"the substantial probability of the deprivation of the indigent's [newly granted] liberty."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301 (1). The PCRA does not apply here.
In addition to providing counsel for any indigent person facing a deprivation of
liberty, the IDA also provides counsel where a constitutional right has been denied. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-32-304(3) ("assigned counsel for an indigent shall be entitled to
compensation . . . [where] the indigent has been denied a constitutional right"). A
plurality of the Utah Supreme Court recognized this in Gardner. Gardner v. Holden, 888
P.2d 608, 622 n.5 (Utah 1994). Admittedly, the language in Gardner is dicta. However,
Gardner is suggestive that the IDA should be read to mean what is says: Once the district
court has determined an indigent person's constitutional rights were violated, the IDA
recognizes a right to state compensated counsel.
The State's final argument that the IDA is inapplicable here is that Mr. Ford did
not satisfy the pre-requisites for the appointment of counsel under the IDA. (Second Br.
at 20-22.) Even though the State repeatedly represents that it 'does not represent any"
party that has standing to make this argument, (id at 21, 22 n.4, 23 n. 5), the State
nonetheless spends four pages arguing that the district court (i) failed to notify the
"responsible entity" under section 77-32-303(1) of the hearing at which it appointed
The State suggests that there is no right to counsel until the State exhausts all appeals
because the determination that Mr. Ford's constitutional rights were violated is not
"final." (Second Br. at 17.) This cannot be correct. Plainly, once all appeals are
exhausted, Mr. Ford would no longer need appointed counsel. And to wait to litigate the
issue until that time would needlessly waste judicial resources.
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counsel under the IDA and (ii) failed to find a compelling reason to appointing counsel
other than SLDA, as required under section 77-32-303. (Second Br. at 20.) Both
arguments fail on the merits, even if the State had standing to raise them.
In the district court, the State represented that Salt Lake County was the
responsible entity. (Second Br. at 22 n.4.) Now, it is not so sure, offering that perhaps
SLDA is the responsible entity. (Second Br. at 21-22.) Regardless, both entities had
notice of the hearing.
The district court specifically found that the Salt Lake County District Attorney
had notice of the hearing, and the district attorney, unlike counsel for the State, does
represent Salt Lake County. (R. 417.) The State has cited to no authority that this notice
was defective and has marshaled no evidence to demonstrate the factual finding was
clearly erroneous.
In addition, SLDA had notice. SLDA represented Mr. Ford before withdrawing
due to a conflict of interest and therefore knew non-contracting counsel was going to be
appointed. In addition, SLDA received the same notice as did the district attorney. (R.
393.) Finally, if SLDA was the responsible entity, the only reason to notify it of the
hearing would be to ensure there was a compelling reason to appoint counsel other than
SLDA. Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-303 (requiring notice to the proper entity "to consider
the authorization or designation of the noncontract attorney or resource," including
whether "there is a compelling reason to authorize or designate a noncontracting
attorney"). However, the district court had already allowed SLDA to withdraw due to a
conflict of interest, and therefore, no further evidence from SLDA was required to
determine whether there was a compelling reason to designate a noncontracting attorney,
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as the district court had already determined there was. Even if the State had standing, its
argument concerning notice to the responsible entity fails.
The State's additional contention that a conflict of interest is not a compelling
reason to require conflict counsel is puzzling. (Second Br. at 23.) The State speculates
that SLDA's contract with Salt Lake County may preclude Mr. Ford's current counsel
from serving as counsel. SLDA's contract is not in the record, and the State's
speculation about it is irrelevant. In the end, the State has provided no reason to reverse
the district court's ruling that Mr. Ford is entitled to counsel appointed under the IDA.
Because with this appeal the State seeks to obtain the legal authority to deprive
Mr. Ford of his current liberty interest by sending him to prison, Mr. Ford has a right to
paid counsel to defend against the State's appeal under the United States Constitution, the
Utah Constitution, and the IDA. The Court should affirm.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Ford served 13 years in prison for possession of a dangerous weapon, even
though he was never provided a preliminary hearing under article I, section 13. The State
concedes that failure to present a charge to a magistrate in a preliminary hearing
precludes the trial court from obtaining subject matter jurisdiction. Here, Mr. Ford never
received a preliminary hearing by a member of the judiciary, as required under article I,
section 13. Therefore, his original trial court never obtained subject matter jurisdiction to
convict and sentence him. The district court did not err when it vacated Mr. Ford's
conviction and sentence.
In addition, the legislature's delegation to a court commissioner the authority to
conduct a preliminary hearing was unconstitutional under article V, section 1 and article
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VII, section 1. Conducting a preliminary hearing is a non-delegable core judicial
function, as magistrates enter final judgments and their bindover orders are immediately
enforceable. For this additional reason, Mr. Ford's original trial court never obtained
subject matter jurisdiction. Even if the commissioner had de facto judicial authority, Mr.
Ford is still entitled to relief as the first citizen to bring it to the court's attention. This
provides an alternative ground to affirm.
Finally, the district court did not err in appointing paid counsel for Mr. Ford. With
this appeal, the State is attempting to deprive Mr. Ford of his current liberty and to send
Mr. Ford back to prison. The State's use of the judicial process to strip away such a
fundamental liberty interest requires state-appointed counsel under the United States
Constitution, the Utah Constitution, and the IDA. The Court should affirm.
DATED this 13th day of February, 2008.
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.

Troyl>. BTooher
Attorney for Solomon Lee Ford
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Third Judicial District

STATE OF UTAH

APR 2 5 2006
SALT LAKE

SOLOMON LEE FORD,
Petitioner pro se,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,'
Respondent.

By.

TV5L<Deputy Clerk

Decision on Petition for PostConviction Relief and State's
Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Case No. 050909964
Judge John Paul Kennedy

The court, having reviewed the papers filed by the respective parties and having listened
to the oral arguments by Petitioner acting pro se and by Counsel for the Respondent, hereby
renders this decision on the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the State's Motion to Dismiss
the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief:
Procedural Background:
On August 19, 1993, the State charged the Petitioner Solomon Lee Ford (hereinafter,
"Ford" or ccthe Petitioner") with aggravated assault and possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person. Ford's preliminary hearing was held before then Commissioner Frances M.
Palacios. Commissioner Palacios bound Ford over for trial on the criminal charges. A jury
subsequently convicted Ford on the weapons charge. He was sentenced to prison where he now
remains incarcerated.
In March 1995, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed Ford's conviction in an unpublished
opinion. State v. Ford, slip op. 940044-CA (March 21,1995). In that proceeding, Ford did not

*The one appropriate respondent in this case is the State of Utah, which was not initially named,
but was served. URCP 65C(h). The case title initially included Frances Palacios as Respondent. The
court has changed the name of the Respondent as required by the rule.

make any claim that his conviction was unlawful on the basis that he had been bound over by a
Commissioner.
On May 20, 1996, Ford filed his first petition for post-conviction relief. Third District
Court case number 9600903799. Thereafter, he filed a second petition. Third District Court case
number 970905132. In neither case did Ford include a claim that his conviction was illegal
because he had been bound over by a Commissioner. Both petitions were dismissed.
A third petition for post-conviction relief was filed on March 12, 1999. The district court
in that case adopted the State's summary of the four claims made by Ford, including that "the
commissioner lacked authority to preside at [Ford's] preliminary hearing." Again, the State
moved to dismiss the petition, which motion was granted by the court (Case number 990902794,
March 23, 2000, Hon. Judge Tyrone Medley) which concluded, among other things, that Ford's
challenge to the court Commissioner's authority to preside at the preliminary hearing "did not
present a challenge to the court's jurisdiction to try petitioner." The district court accepted the
State's arguments and, therefore, ruled that Ford's claim was procedurally barred. The court also
concluded that allowing a Commissioner (at that time) to preside at a preliminary hearing was
not an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority.
Ford appealed that decision and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Ford's claims
were procedurally barred. Ford v. Kent Morgan, et al., case no. 20000187-CA (2000). The Utah
Supreme Court denied Ford's petition for review. Ford v. Morgan, 20 P.3d 403 (Utah 2001).
Neither court specifically addressed the jurisdictional issue which Petitioner attempted to raise.
Parties' Current Contentions:
The present petition is Ford's fourth bite at the apple. He again claims that his criminal
conviction is void because a court Commissioner had no authority to bind him over to stand trial.
In essence, Ford claims that in 1993 a court Commissioner could not lawfully preside at a
preliminary hearing. Thus, Ford contends, he was not lawfully bound over, and thus, there was
no jurisdiction for the trial court to proceed with the jury trial. Ford therefore claims that his
conviction was improper and that he should now be released from custody. Ford asserts that
although he raised a claim of no jurisdiction in his third petition, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals never ruled on that issue. He contends that jurisdictional issues may be raised at any
time and, in order to obtain a ruling, he does so again in this petition..
The State responds to Ford's contentions by arguing that Ford bears the burden of proving
a jurisdictional defect, which the State claims he has not done. In the alternative, the State
asserts that Ford is now procedurally barred from successfully pressing this claim. In support of
this contention, the State notes that Ford raised the jurisdictional issue in his third petition and
lost that claim in the district court. Moreover, he failed to raise the jurisdictional issue in his first
two petitions even though he could have done so.
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The State notes that in the third post-conviction proceeding it conceded that a defect in
subject matter jurisdiction would overcome a procedural bar. In this proceeding, however, the
State apparently disavows that concession and argues that Ford must demonstrate that a
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction cannot be procedurally barred. See fn. 4, State's
Supplemental Memorandum (Jan. 24,2006).
In essence, Petitioner argues that a literal reading of Judge Medley's ruling leaves unclear
whether or not, in considering the third petition for relief, the trial court found that Petitioner had
raised a jurisdictional issue. While the decision states that "[a] commissioner, when presiding at
a preliminary hearing, exercises none of the powers of a judge and does not function as a court of
record", and thus concludes that cc[a]llowing a court commissioner to preside at a preliminary
hearing is not an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority", it does not address the
question which Petitioner raises here. The problem which is alleged here is that the Legislature
acting alone could not authorize Commissioners to function as magistrates presiding over
preliminary hearings. The State's echo of Supreme Court characterization of the authority of
magistrates as being non-judicial does not solve the problem. Further careful reading of Judge
Medley's ruling reveals that the precise jurisdictional defect which this court is asked to analyze
here was not adequately addressed earlier.
In addition to its other arguments, the State further affirmatively argues that Ford has not
established that the Commissioner lacked authority to preside at Ford's preliminary hearing. In
support, the State begins this argument by admitting that Ford contends that because the Judicial
Council's rules did not authorize a Commissioner to serve as a magistrate, the Commissioner
lacked authority to do so in this case. The State also concedes that Utah Code Sec. 78-3-31(9)
(1993)(addendum B) required the Judicial Council to establish rules detailing "the types of cases
and matters commissioners may hear." Further, the State does not dispute that as of the time of
Petitioner's preliminary hearing, no such rules had been adopted by the Judicial Council. But,
the State asserts, "nothing in that legislation limits commissioners' duties to those described in
any Judicial Council's rules." The State further notes that the term "magistrate" includes a court
Commissioner. Supplemental Reply at fn. 4, p. 7, citing Utah Code 77-1-3(4) (1993).
Additionally, the State argues that when Ford's Commissioner presided as a magistrate at
his preliminary hearing, she was not unconstitutionally perfbrifiing a judicial function of a court of
record. The State cites Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994), and State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 299,
303-04 (Utah 1998), for the proposition that the Supreme Court has recognized that
Commissioners may perform functions that are "reviewable by a judge" because '^ultimate judicial
power remains with the judge." The State argues also that in Ford's preliminary hearing,
"ultimate judicial power" remained with the trial judge, who had authority to review the
Commissioner's probable cause determination subsequent to the bindover and was not required to
give any deference to the Commissioner's determination. Moreover^ the State notes that the
Commissioner's actions were not even subject to appellate review until the district court judge has
acted on them. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464,456-66 (Utah 1991).

^

Discussion:
The questions presented by this petition and motion to dismiss are (1) whether a
Commissioner in 1993 had authority to preside over a preliminary hearing; (2) if the
Commissioner did not have such authority, whether the bindover was lawful; and (3) if the
bindover was not lawful, did the district court have jurisdiction to try the Petitioner for the alleged
crimes. The ultimate question is thus a question of jurisdiction. Jurisdictional questions may
indeed be raised at any time and should be raised (even sua sponte by the court). See, Petersen v.
Utah Bd of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148,1151 (Utah 1995).
As stated above, in considering the third petition, the trial court found that Petitioner "had
not presented a challenge to the court's jurisdiction to try Petitioner." See decision of Hon. Judge
Tyrone Medley in Case no. 990902794. In this fourth petition, the Petitioner has stated
unequivocally that he is indeed challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court which tried him on
the charges. This court has reviewed carefully the trial court's ruling on the third petition for
relief as well as the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that ruling. In this court's view,
neither of those decisions specifically addresses the question raised by Petitioner concerning
jurisdiction.
In this proceeding the State "acknowledges that a preliminary hearing and bindover are
'essential to a court's jurisdiction over a felony.'" State's Supp. Memo at 8. But, the State
asserts that a "defect" in the preliminary hearing will not render a subsequent conviction void. Id.
The State continues, contending that Ford "must establish that proceeding on a preliminary
hearing before and being bound over by a person who lacked authority to do either equates to
having no preliminary hearing at all." Id. To support its position, the State cites Salt Lake City v.
Ohms, supra, where the Supreme Court found that the Legislature had unconstitutionally
delegated judicial authority to court Commissioners. Id. at 48-52. In Ohms, the Court did not
invalidate prior judgments entered by Commissioners because they had acted with "de facto
authority." Id. at 853-55. The State tries to extend the ruling of the Court in Ohms to this case by
arguing that the court Commissioner had de facto authority to preside at a preliminary hearing and
thus, the resulting bindover should be treated as valid, just as the Commissioners' judgments were
considered valid in Ohms.
In determining the answer to the ultimate jurisdiction question presented here, it is
appropriate to begin with reference to Utah Constitution Article I, Sec. 13, which provides in
pertinent part:
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall
be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by
a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with
the consent of the State
Hence, the right to a preliminary hearing by a magistrate in felony cases prior to binding the
matter over for trial is a constitutional right. This constitutional Section is the foundation for an
accused's right to a preliminary hearing before a magistrate.
4

The right to a preliminary examination is also set forth in the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See Rule 7(h)(1)—(2) (as of 1993):

(h)(1) A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and
laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has
the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. . . }
(h)(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to
believe that the crime charged has been committed and that the
defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall order, in writing,
that the defendant be bound over to answer in the district court. . . .3
The right of an accused to a preliminary hearing has long been regarded as a "substantial"
right. State v. Pay, 45 Utah 411, 134 Pac. 632 (1915).
The State in essence asserts that in 1993 it did not matter who conducted this
constitutionally-required and rule-mandated proceeding, even though it is a fundamental
cornerstone of criminal procedure. Notwithstanding the State's position, however, this court
believes that a determination to bind over a defendant for trial is a crucial determination which has
the potential to eventually subject a defendant to all of the issues present in a public criminal
prosecution. The fact that such a determination may not be immediately appealable makes the
role of the magistrate an even more important part of the process. Indeed, the fact that the
magistrate's ruling may be reviewed by the trial court, does not make it any less significant.
If, through legislation and without the oversight of the Judicial Branch, any person at all
could be given the title of a "magistrate" to preside over a preliminary hearing, then the
constitutional right to such a hearing as a part of the criminal prosecution process could become
meaningless. Hence, to avoid the problem of holding preliminary hearings before an
unauthorized (and perhaps incapable) person, the input of the Judicial Council was a prerequisite
for the proper designation of a magistrate. The attempt of the Legislature, acting without
concurrence of the Judiciary, to allow a court Commissioner to function as a magistrate in
preliminary hearings could not be considered sufficient to grant proper authority to a
Commissioner to so act.

2

The current Rule 7(h)(1) states: "If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant
shall be advised of the right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to a
preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall order the
defendant bound over to answer in district court."
3

The language of this paragraph is now found in substance in Rule 7(I)(2).
5

Therefore, because it is necessary for a magistrate to serve only as approved by the
Judiciary, it may be stated that a defendant charged with a felony has a right to a preliminary
hearing before a "properly authorized" magistrate.
This court thus accepts Petitioner's claim in this case that at the time of his preliminary
hearing in 1993, the Legislature had improperly and unlawfully attempted to authorize
Commissioners to function as magistrates in preliminary hearings. Petitioner correctly points out
that this was done without authority of the Judicial Branch.
In 1993, Utah Code Section 77-1-3 (4) provided:
"Magistrate" means a justice or judge of a court of record or not of
record or a commissioner of such a court appointed in accordance
with Section 78-3-31.
However, the 1993 version of Section 78-3-31 did more than describe the procedure and
minimum qualifications for appointment of Commissioners. Additionally, it in effect purported to
permit Commissioners to act with the authority of a magistrate in misdemeanor cases. See
subsection (6). While Section 78-3-31(9) deferred to the Judicial Branch operating through the
Judicial Council to establish rules "defining the duties and authority of court commissioners for
each level of court they serve[,]" the Judicial Council, in 1993, however, had not established any
rules defining the duties and authority of court Commissioners and specifically had not allowed a
Commissioner to act as a magistrate in a preliminary hearing.
In 1994, the Supreme Court perceived the potential for problems in allowing the
Legislature to thus expand the powers of Commissioners without control by the Judicial Branch.
In Salt Lake City v. Ohms, supra, the Supreme Court ruled that the pre-1995 Utah Code Section
78-3-31 was unconstitutional to the extent that it purported to vest ultimate power of courts of
record in persons who have not been duly appointed as Article VIII judges pursuant to the
requirements of the Utah Constitution. Specifically, the Court in Ohms found that the section
violated the Utah Constitution by granting Commissioners the power to enter final judgments and
impose sentences in criminal misdemeanor cases. The rejection by the Supreme Catift of this
attempt by the Legislative Branch to dictate the manner in which Commissioners exercise their
authority as magistrates casts a shadow upon the legislative landscape from which the authorizing
statute in the present case emerged.
In 1993, Commissioner Palacios conducted the preliminary hearing under the auspices of
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-7-17.5, which at the time stated:
In felony cases, only a judge or a commissioner of a court of
record may conduct an initial appearance, preliminary examination,
or arraignment.
As already noted, in 1993 there were no rules established by the Judicial Branch (including the
Judicial Council) which allowed a Commissioner to exercise authority as a magistrate presiding
6

over preliminary hearings.4 Indeed, the procedural rule which described how an accused's right to
a preliminary hearing was to be carried out had no reference to Commissioner, but instead cited
only to magistrates. See, Rule 7, Utah Rules of Crim. Proc. (1993). Without authorization by the
Judicial Branch (including authorization by rule of the Judicial Council and tacit approval of the
authorization in the Rules of Criminal Procedure) this provision in the Utah Code which dictated
who and how a magistrate must exercise his or her authority in affording the protections
guaranteed under Article 1, Section 13, of the Utah Constitution cannot be upheld as applied to
Petitioner's case.
Thus, this court believes that despite the fact that Section 77-1-3(4) included
Commissioners within the term of "magistrate," to the extent that the Section, together with
Section 78-7-17.5 purported to extend to a Commissioner the authority to function as a magistrate
in preliminary hearings, which authority was not sanctioned by any Judicial Council rule, it was
unconstitutional. Cf, Salt Lake City v. Ohms, supra.
The State contends that despite the fact that the Commissioner in Ford's preliminary
hearing was not authorized by rule of the Judicial Council to function as a magistrate presiding
over such proceedings, the Commissioner nevertheless acted with de facto authority [citing Ohms,
supra]. Again, this court cannot agree. The theory ofde facto authority does not fulfill the
Petitioner's constitutional right to a preliminary hearing presided over by a properly authorized
magistrate when charged with a felony. Unlike the determination ofde facto authority in Ohms,
the constitutional rights of criminal defendants charged with felonies cannot and should not be
swept away by an assertion of de facto authority.
Thus, this court agrees with Petitioner that Commissioner Palacios lacked proper authority
to preside over his preliminary hearing in 1993. Having reached this conclusion, the question then
arises as to whether Petitioner either in essence waived his right to a preliminary hearing or
whether the lack of the Commissioner's authority constituted a "defect" which was waived by
Petitioner's failure to object to the matter when he first petitioned for post-conviction relief.
There is no doubt that an accused may waive his right to a preliminary hearing. Utah
Constitution Article I, Section 13; U.R.Cr.P. 7(g)(l)(1993); a n d ^ e , e.g. State v. AfgUelles, 2001
UT 1, $53, 63 P.3d 73 L Such a waiver, however, must be knowingly, imtiltigesitly, aftd
voluntarily done. Under Article I, Section 13, and Rule 7(g)(l)(l 993) such a waiver must also be
with the consent of the State. It could be argued that when Petitioner (who was represented by
counsel) proceeded to trial following the hearing before Commissioner Palacios, he effectively
waived any objection to her lack of authority, and thereby waived his right to a preliminary
hearing.
This court, however, does not believe that Petitioner knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his constitutional right to a preliminary hearing before a properly authorized
magistrate. The fact is, Petitioner insisted upon a preliminary hearing. Nor does this court

This issue no longer exists inasmuch as presently preliminary hearings are conducted only by
Article VIII appointed judges acting as magistrates.
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believe that Commissioner Palacios' lack of authority to function as a magistrate constitutes a
mere "defect/' as the State contends. Rather, from this court's perspective, it would appear that
Petitioner was denied a fundamental right to have a preliminary hearing before a duly authorized
magistrate.
Without a properly authorized magistrate, there was no valid preliminary hearing. The
proceeding before the Commissioner in this case wasn't subject to a mere "defect." The hearing
was a nullity. Cf, State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 125,71 P.2d 196 (1937), where the Court observed
that a prosecution should not proceed absent the necessary findings by a magistrate who was
vested by the Judiciary with authority to conduct the preliminary hearing on the subject charges.
Without a valid preliminary hearing, there was no proper bindover to the district court, and the
district court thus lacked jurisdiction to require Ford to proceed to trial.
This petition was filed under Rule 65C, which is subject to the requirements of the PostConviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 78-35A-101 et seq. Section 78-35A-106
establishes specific requirements regarding what matters are excluded from post-conviction relief.
Section 106(l)(d) provides that a defendant is precluded from raising any ground for relief that
"was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief."
Although Ford attempted to raised the issues under consideration here in his third petition,
no prior Court has yet addressed the issue. As noted above, jurisdictional issues can and should
be raised at any time. The jurisdiction of various courts is established either directly by the
constitution or by authority vested by the constitution in the Judicial Branch, including
establishing the powers of its judicial and quasi-judicial officers. To interpret the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act as precluding the issue raised in this petition would be nothing less than to exalt
that statutory provision above a right created in the Utah Constitution. As was the case in Ohms,
supra, "it was not within [Ohms'] power to invest by a 'waiver' the right to perform core judicial
duties in persons to whom that right has not been granted by Article VIII, section 4." Id at 853.
Similarly, it is not within the Legislature's power to divest a petitioner of his Article I, Section 13,
right to a preliminary hearing before a properly authorized magistrate, either by granting authority
to individuals not authorized to act by the Judicial Branch, or through operation of the PostConviction Remedies Act.
If the trial court had ruled in Ford's previous case that the legislature is authorized to
delegate the authority to preside over preliminary hearings without the approval of the Judicial
Branch, or if the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court had ruled on this precise jurisdictional
issue when the matter was on review, then of course this court would be governed by such a
ruling. This did not happen, however, and thus, there is no procedural bar in effect with respect to
this issue.
Consequently, in the opinion of this court, Petitioner was wrongfully bound over for trial
and the trial court was without jurisdiction to try him. The question remains, however, whether
(as suggested by the State) the Petitioner is entitled merely to a new trial, or whether (as
demanded by Petitioner) he is entitled to immediate release. Since this particular question has
not been fully briefed, the court hereby requests that the State file a brief on this question within
si

30 days from the date of this Decision. Petitioner shall then have 30 days to respond, and the
State an additional 10 days to reply.
Because Petitioner remains impecunious, the court appoints Legal Defense Association to
represent him in these proceedings.
Dated: April 25,2006
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SOLOMON LEE FORD,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER

vs.

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Case No. 050909964
Honorable John Paul Kennedy

Solomon Lee Ford's Motion for Hearing to Appoint Counsel Under the Indigent Defense
Act and to Declare Appointed Counsel is Entitled to Compensation for Representing Mr. Ford
(the "Motion") was heard on May 31, 2007. Troy L. Booher and Emily Smith Hoffman
appeared for Petitioner Mr. Ford, and Thomas Brunker appeared for the State.
Having reviewed and considered the parties' written memoranda and oral arguments,
having weighed and considered the evidence received at the hearing on the Motion, and after
considering such other and further matters as the Court deems appropriate, the Court hereby
FINDS, CONCLUDES, and ORDERS as follows:

445504

FINDINGS OF FACT
I.

Procedural Background
1.

On April 25, 2006, the Court granted Mr. Ford's petition for post-conviction

relief, ruling that Mr. Ford "was wrongfully bound over for trial and the trial court was without
jurisdiction to try him." (4/25/2006 Order at 8.) As a result, the Court vacated Mr. Ford's
sentence and conviction. (Id.) The Court also ruled that it would appoint Salt Lake Legal
Defenders ("SLDA") to represent Mr. Ford because he was indigent. (Id. at 9.)
2.

After briefing from both the State and Mr. Ford, on August 15, 2006, the Court

ordered Mr. Ford's immediate release from prison. (8/15/2006 Order.)
3.

The State has appealed the Court's April 25, 2006 ruling that granted Mr. Ford's

petition for post-conviction relief. (7/10/2007 Notice of Appeal.)
4.

On February 2, 2007, SLDA moved to withdraw as counsel due to a conflict of

interest. (2/2/2007 Motion to Withdraw as Court-Appointed Counsel.) On March 6, 2007, the
State stipulated to entry of an order substituting Mr. Booher as counsel, but objected to any
appointment that was other than pro bono, (3/5/2007 Response to Motion for Entry of Order
Approving Substitution of Counsel.) March 19, 2007, the Court entered an order appointing Mr.
Booher as counsel for Mr. Ford, but did not rule on the issue of whether Mr. Booher would serve
as paid counsel. (3/19/2007 Order.)
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5.

On March 12,2007, Mr. Ford filed a motion to have Mr. Booher appointed as

paid counsel. (3/12/2007 Motion for Paid Counsel.) On April 2,2007, the State opposed the
Motion. (4/2/2007 Memorandum in Opposition.) This Motion was heard on May 31, 2007.
II.

Mr. Ford Remains Indigent
6.

The Court's April 25, 2006 finding that Mr. Ford is indigent remains in place, as

Mr. Ford still cannot afford counsel to represent him in response to the State's appeal. The Court
bases this finding on the following evidence:
7.

Between March 1993 and Augustfr995;Mr. Ford was incarcerated in the Utah

State Prison with no means of earning any significant income. (Ford Aff. at ^|3.) At the time the
Motion was filed, Mr. Ford worked in the warehouse at Kimball Equipment Company, mostly
operating a forklift. (Ford Aff. at %5.) Mr. Ford's job pays him $870 every two weeks and is his
only source of income. (Id.) Mr. Ford owns no real property, has no savings, and does not have
a sufficient credit history to borrow significant sums of money. (Id.)
8.

Of the $1,740 Mr. Ford earns every month, $432 is deducted to pay taxes, $400 is

used to pay rent, and $200 is used to support Mr. Ford's son, Dejuan Ford. (Ford Aff. at ^[6.) In
addition, Mr. Ford spends approximately $400 per month on food and $100 on clothing, mostly
for his work, which leaves approximately $208 per month that is discretionary. (Id.)
9.

Mr. Ford's $208 per month in discretionary income is not sufficient to pay for

legal counsel in light of the likely costs in defending against the State's appeal. The likely cost
to respond to the State's appeal is between $15,000 and $45,000. (Sherman Aff. at f6.)
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10.

Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Ford is indigent because he does not have

sufficient income, assets, credit, or other means to provide for the payment of legal counsel and
all other necessary expenses of representation without depriving Mr. Ford or his family of food,
shelter, clothing, and other necessities.
11.

Mr. Ford's status as indigent has not changed since the Court first determined he

was indigent on March 25, 2006.
HI.

The County Had Notice of the Motion and Hearing
12.

At the time of the hearing, the Court was aware of the contract between SLDA

and Salt Lake County to provide legal services for the indigent.
13.

On April 9, 2007, Mr. Ford served all papers relevant to the Motion on the Salt

Lake County District Attorney. (4/9/2007 Certificate of Service.)
14.

At the hearing, Mr. Booher represented to the Court that his office had mailed a

copy of the Notice of Hearing to the Salt Lake County District Attorney on or about May 5,
2007. The Court finds that such notice of the hearing was in fact sent to the County.
15.

The County was properly notified of the indigency determination at issue during

the May 31,2007 hearing as well as the hearing itself.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.

Mr. Ford is Entitled to Paid Counsel Under the Indigent Defense A c t
1.

Under the Indigent Defense Act, "indigency" is defined as "a person [who] does

not have sufficient income, assets, credit, or other means to provide for the payment of legal
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counsel and all other necessary expenses of representation without depriving Mr. Ford or his
family of food, shelter, clothing, and other necessities." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32~202(3)(a). In
determining whether a person is indigent, courts must consider the probable expense and burden
of defending against the State; any ownership of, or interest in, any tangible or intangible
personal or real property or reasonable expectancy of any such interest, the amounts of any
debts; the number and ages of any dependents; and any other relevant factors. Id. at 77-32202(3)(b). Based upon the facts presented with the Motion and at the Hearing, Mr. Ford remains
indigent.
2.

Under the Act, an indigent is entitled to paid counsel when he "faces the

substantial probability of the deprivation of the indigent's liberty." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32301(1). Because Mr. Ford's conviction and sentence were vacated, the State's appeal poses a
substantial probability of depriving Mr. Ford of a liberty interest. Therefore, Mr. Ford is entitled
to paid counsel to defend against the State's appeal under section 77-32-301(1).
3.

Under the Act, an indigent is also entitled to paid counsel to prosecute "remedies

before or after conviction, considered by defense counsel to be in the interest of justice except
for other and subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-32-301(6). This language permits Mr. Ford paid counsel to pursue a post-conviction
remedy insofar as the proceedings are not discretionary as to Mr. Ford. Because it is the State,
not Mr. Ford, that has chosen to appeal the Court's ruling and challenge the current status quo,
the appeal is not a discretionary proceeding as to Mr. Ford. Therefore, Mr. Ford is entitled to
paid counsel to defend against the Staters appeal under section 77-32-301(6).
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4.

The Act applies in the post-conviction setting even though it has the formal label

of "civil," as such labels do not determine whether the right to counsel attaches. In re Gault 387
U.S. 1,19, 36 (1967).
5.

Under the Act, assigned counsel is entitled to compensation if "the indigent has

been denied a constitutional right." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-304(3)(b)(i). In granting Mr.
Ford's petition for post-conviction relief, the Court vacated Mr. Ford's conviction and sentence,
ruling that Mr. Ford was denied his constitutional right under article I section 13 of the Utah
Constitution to be "prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a
magistrate." Therefore, Mr. Ford is entitled to paid counsel to defend against the State's appeal
under section 77-32-304(3)(b)(i), which applies in the post-conviction setting. Gardner v.
Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 622 n.5 (Utah 1994).
6.

The Post Conviction Relief Act does not control whether Mr. Ford is entitled to

paid counsel to defend against the State's appeal, but instead merely provides that a court "may,
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-35a-109(l). The PCRA does not preclude appointment of counsel under the Act and
does not conflict with the appointment of paid counsel under the Act. The PCRA addresses the
appointment of counsel for the initial disposition of post-conviGtion petitions, whereas the Act
expressly excludes "discretionary writ proceedings." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301(6). The very
proceedings that are expressly excluded from the Act are those covered the PCRA. Therefore,
section 78-35a-109(l) does not control the issue presented here.
7.

Section 78-35a-109(l) does demonstrate, however, that the prior appointment of

SLDA was pursuant to the Act and not the PCRA, as this section prohibits the appointment of
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counsel who "represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal/' which SLDA did in this
case.
8.

Under the Act, to appoint non-contract counsel, such as Mr. Booher, a court first

must set the matter for a hearing, provide notice of the hearing to the attorney of the responsible
county, and make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a non-contracting
attorney. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-32-302(2)(e) and -303. The Act defines a "compelling reason"
as "a conflict of interest." Id at § 77-32-201(2). Because SLDA had to withdraw as counsel due
to a conflict of interest, there is a compelling reason to appoint non-contracting counsel such as
Mr. Booher. The Court set the matter for a hearing on May 31, 2007, and the Salt Lake County
District Attorney had notice of the hearing. The elements of sections 77-32-302(2)(e) and 77-32303 are satisfied, and the Court therefore appoints Mr. Booher as paid counsel under the Act.
II.

Mr- Ford is Entitled to Paid Counsel Under the Utah Constitution.
9.

Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." This provision guarantees
"fundamental fairness" during court proceedings. Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, ^29, 122 P.3d
628. Because Mr. Ford has a fundamental liberty interest of which the State is attempting to
deprive him, and because the State has paid counsel to prosecute its appeal, fundamental fairness
requires that Mr. Ford also have paid counsel to defend against the State's appeal.
10.

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides the right to counsel in

criminal prosecutions. Because Mr. Ford faces prison if the State is successful on appeal, the
State's appeal is functionally equivalent to an original criminal prosecution and the right to
counsel attaches.
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11.

The right to paid counsel under article I, section 12 applies even though this

proceeding is post-conviction because if the State is successful in its appeal, Mr. Ford will be
punished by being sent back to prison. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1167-69 (Utah
1988) (explaining that whether a contempt proceeding is criminal or civil depends upon whether
the purpose is to impose punishment). Therefore, Mr. Ford has a right to paid counsel under
article I, section 12.
III.

Mr. Ford Has A Right To Paid Counsel Under The Federal Constitution.
12.

Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, one accused of a

crime has the right to the assistance of counsel. The United States Supreme Court has held that
this right attaches to all critical stages of original criminal proceedings that could result in
imprisonment, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972); including a first appeal of right, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
For a discretionary appeal following an affirmance of a conviction in a first appeal of right, the
right to counsel does not attach because the subsequent appeal is discretionary on the part of the
person accused of a crime.1 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). However, where
a first appeal of right is successful, and the State petitions for discretionary review, the right to
counsel does attach because the proceeding is not discretionary as to the person whose liberty
interest is in jeopardy. Blankenship v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 312, 317 (5th Cir. 1997). Similarly
here, it is the State, not Mr. Ford, that has exercised its discretion to appeal, an appeal that could

Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly linked the rationale for why there is no Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings and in discretionary appeals from
the initial right to appeal a criminal conviction. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,275 (2000).
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result in Mr. Ford's imprisonment, and therefore, Mr. Ford's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches.
13.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, no state may

"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The United States Supreme Court
has interpreted these provisions to require a state to provide financial assistance, including
counsel, when a state seeks to deprive a person of a fundamental liberty interest.2
14.

While a number of such cases involve original criminal proceedings, the label of

"criminal" is irrelevant to whether the right itself attaches. In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967).
15.

Also, the fact that many of these cases involve the payment for resources (such as

a transcript) instead of attorney fees makes no difference, as just as a transcript may by rule or
custom be a prerequisite to appellate review, the services of a lawyer will for virtually every
layman be necessary to present an appeal in a form suitable for appellate consideration on the
merits. Where there is a fundamental right in jeopardy, a state has an obligation under the
Fourteenth Amendment to provide resources, including paid counsel, sufficient to permit one to
defend that fundamental right. Because the State seeks to send Mr. Ford to prison with its
appeal, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the appointment of paid counsel to represent
Mr. Ford.

Griffin v. Illinois. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requirement of criminal defendant to procure trial
transcript in order to appeal in essence "bolt[ed] the door to equal justice"); Bums v. Ohio, 360
U.S. 252, 253 (1959) (filing fee for motion for leave to appeal from judgment of intermediate
appellate court to State Supreme Court must be waived when defendant is indigent); Smithy.
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing fee to process state habeas corpus application must be
waived for indigent prisoner).

445504

9

ORDER
For the reasons stated above and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr, Ford's Motion for Hearing to Appoint Counsel
Under the Indigent Defense Act and to Declare Appointed Counsel is Entitled to Compensation
for Representing Mr. Ford is hereby GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Booher is hereby appointed paid counsel to
represent Mr. Ford in response to the State's appeal in this case under the Indigent Defense Act,
article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Booher is to serve a copy of this Order on Salt
Lake County;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is to send a copy of this Order to
Salt Lake County pursuant to Utah Code section 77-32-202(4).
DATED this ^

day of June, 2007.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This will certify that on the

day of June, 2007,1 caused a true and correct copy of

the foregoing to be served on the following by depositing the same in the United States mail, first
class postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Thomas B. Brunker
Office of the Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Lisa Collins
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114
Salt Lake County District Attorney
111 East Broadway, #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Commissions

TOGETHER W I T H THE CONSTITUTION OE T H E U N I T E D STATES, T H E
CONSTITUTION OE U T A H , T H E E N A B L I N G ACT, A N D
m m ? JCT Amrrx> AT rrr Arnm-Kf

T ATTTQ

COUNTIES—CLAIMS A N D W A R R A N T S .

210

been actually rendered, and, before allowance, such claims must be presented to
the county attorney, who must indorse thereon, in writing, his opinion as to the
legality thereof. If the county attorney declare the claim illegal, he must state
specifically wherein it is illegal, and the claim must then be rejected by said
board. [0. L. § 204* j '96, p. 536*.
5 3 6 . Officers n o t t o a d v o c a t e c l a i m s of o t h e r s . No county officer
shall, except for his own services, present any claim, account, or demand for
allowance against the county, nor in any way advocate the relief asked in the
claim or demand made by any other. Any person may appear before the board;
and oppose the allowance of any claim or demand made against the county.
['9(1, p. 534.

537. Warrants. Form. Payment. Registration. County charges'
t o b e a u d i t e d . Warrants drawn by order of the board of county commissioner
on the county treasury for current expenses during each year, must specify tlT
liability for which they are drawn, when they accrued, and the funds from which:
they are to be paid, and must be paid in the order of presentation to the treasurer
If the fund is insufficient to pay any warrant, it must be registered, and there-,
after paid in the order of registration. Accounts for county charges of every
description must be presented to the board of county commissioners, to be audited
as prescribed in this title. [C. L. §§ 200, 208; '96, pp. 535, 570.
W a n ant must specify liability, \ 606

Registering warrants, \ 557.

5 3 8 . C o u n t y c h a r g e s , w h a t are. The following are county charges:
1. Charges incurred against the county by virtue of any of the provisions o
this title.
2. The necessary expenses of the county attorney, incurred in criminal cas
arising in the county, and all other expenses necessarily incurred by him in th„
prosecution of criminal cases.
3. The expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged wit
or convicted of crime and committed therefor to the countyjail.
4. The sums required by law to be paid to jurors in civil cases.
5. The accounts of justices of the peace acting at inquests.
6. All charges and accounts for services rendered by any justice of the pe
for services in the trial and examination of persons charged with crime, not oth
wise provided for by law.
7. The necessary expenses incurred in the support of the county hospital,
poorhouses, and the indigent sick and otherwise dependent poor, whose suppo
is chargeable to the county.
*
8. The contingent expenses necessarily incurred for the use and benefit o
the county.
i
9. Every other sum directed by law to be raised for any county purposeunder the direction of the board of county commissioners, or declared to be*
county charge.
10. The fees of constables for services rendered in criminal cases.
11. The necessary expenses of the sheriff and his deputies incurred in ciyi
and criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses necessaril
incurred by such sheriff or his deputies in the performance of the duties impose
upon them by law.
..
12. The sums required by law to be paid by the county to jurors and wi
nesses serving at inquests and in criminal cases in justices' courts. ['96, i>570-1*.
, „
Boaid to settle and allow accounts, k 511, sub 7,
^ 531
T h e state is not lequircd to pay mileage and at-

tendance of jurors in civil cases Salt Lake Coim
v Richaids, 14 U 142; 46 P 659

539. Costs on removal of criminal action before trial. When

A..,*,v,^«i

«,*+,•/vn ia ™™nvPfl before trial, the costs accruing upon such remov
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CHAPTER 4 .
COUNTY OFFICERS.
> 5 4 0 . E l i g i b i l i t y . No person is eligible to & county, district, or precinct
Office, who, at the time of his election, is not an elector of the county, district, or
*:recinct in which the duties of the office are to be exercised. ['96, p. 537.
) 5 4 1 . Officers e n u m e r a t e d . The officers of a county a r e : three county
commissioners, a county treasurer, a sheriff, a county clerk, a county auditor, a
"ounty recorder, a county attorney, a county surveyor, an assessor, a county
Uperintendent of district schools, and such other officers as may be provided by
"w; provided, that in counties having an assessed valuation of less than twenty
'llions of dollars, the county clerk shall be ex officio auditor of the county and
all perform the duties of such office without extra compensation therefor.
P96,
, 537*.
Salaries of county officers, '$ 2056-2063.

5 4 2 . C o n s o l i d a t i o n of offices. I n counties where the board of county
mmissioners, by proper ordinance shall so elect, the duties of the above men^oned officers niaj' be consolidated in such manner as the board may decide; and
counties where the duties of said officers have been or may hereafter be conblidated, the board of county commissioners thereof, by proper ordinance, may
lect to separate the duties so consolidated and reconsolidate them in any other
aimer, or may separate said duties without reconsolidation and provide t h a t
e duties of each office shall be performed by a separate person, whenever, in
eir discretion, the public interest will be best subserved thereby; provided, t h a t
b such ordinance shall be passed to take effect within less than three months
*ter the passage thereof, and every such ordinance shall take effect on the first
"onday of J a n u a r y next succeeding a general election. ['96, p. 537*.
alaiy when offices consolidated, g 2063.

5 4 3 . Id. D u t i e s of p e r s o n s e l e c t e d . W h e n offices are united and
nsolidated, but one person shall be elected to rill the offices so united and conlidated, and he must take the oath and give the bond required for and
'scharge all the duties pertaining to each. ['96, p. 537.
5 4 4 . P r e c i n c t officers. The officers of a precinct are one justice of the
eace and one constable. The board of county commissioners of each county, as
blic convenience may require, shall divide their respective counties into pres e t s for the purpose of electing justices of the peace and constables. P96, pp.
" 7-8*.
ower to change oi abolish precincts, \ 511, subs. 1, 2.

545. Elections. Terms. Oanvass of vote for county superinIndent. All elective county and precinct officers, except otherwise provided
r in this title, shall be elected at the general election to be held in November,
hteen hundred and ninety-eight, and every two j^ears thereafter, unless otherBe herein provided, and shall take office at twelve o> clock meridian on the first
nday in J a n u a r y next following the date of their election. Commissioners
all be elected as hereinbefore provided. All officers elected under the provisos of this title shall hold office until their successors are elected or appointed
d qualified. The judges of election in each school district in which electors
e entitled to vote for county superintendent of schools, shall canvass the ballots
t for such officer in such district, and certify the result to the county clerks of
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1

and shall issue to the person receiving the highest number of votes cast at said
election for said office, a certificate of election. ['96, p. 538*.
Election of county officers, tie vote, etc., \\ 781,
787 Vacancies filled by county hoard, § 511, sub.
5. Election of county superintendent, £ 1782.
Under an act of congress vacating offices, etc.,
the governor might appoint a successor to the
defendant, a probate judge, elected m 1880 for
t h e t e n n of twoyeais and until his successor should
be elected and qualified, no successor having been
elected m 1882 in consequence of the provisions of

an act of congress. Wenner v. Smith, 4 U. 2
OP. 293.
' U n d e r section2018, pioviding that an incumbent
of an office shall hold until his successor be duly
elected or appointed and qualified, one holding by
appointment will hold over for the succeeding
term, if no election occurs at the time provided
for by statute People, ex rel. Murphy, v. Haidy,
8 U. 68; 29 P 1118.

5 4 6 . D e p u t i e s a n d a s s i s t a n t s . Every county, precinct, or district
officer, except a county commissioner or a judicial officer, may, by and with the
consent of the board of county commissioners, appoint as many deputies and
assistants as may be necessary for the prompt and faithful discharge of the duties
of his office. The appointment of a deputy must be made in writing, and filed in
the office of the county clerk, and, until such ap]:>ointment is so made and filed
and until such deputy shall have taken the oath of office, no one shall be or act
as such deputy; provided, t h a t any officer appointing any deputy shall be liable for
all official acts of such deputy; and provided farther, that the board shall allow the
county clerk such deputies and assistants to transact the business pertaining to
the district courts as may be deemed necessary and advisable by the judge or
judges of the district court. ['96, pp. 538*, 559*.
5 4 7 . " P r i n c i p a l " i n c l u d e s " d e p u t i e s . " Whenever the official name
of any principal officer is used in any law conferring power or imposing duties or
liabilities, it includes deputies. ['96, p. 539.

trict court. The bonds and sureties of all other county and precinct officers must
, be approved by the board of county commissioners before they can be filed and
' recorded. All persons offered as sureties on official bonds shall be examined on
oath touching their qualifications, and no person shall be admitted as surety
r on any such bond unless he is a resident and freeholder within this state, and is
worth, in real or personal property, or both, situate in this state, the amount of
his undertaking, over and above all just debts and liabilities exclusive of property exempt from execution. All official bonds shall be recorded in the office of
the county recorder and then filed and kept in the office of the county clerk.
The official bond of the county clerk, after being recorded, shall be filed and kept
in the office of the county treasurer. [C. L. § 207*; '96, pp. 539-40*.
Power to fir bonds and require renewal, £ 511, sub. 3.

-'duty of all officers in this title named, to complete the business of their respective offices to the time of the expiration of their respective terms; and, in case
an officer at the close of his term shall leave to his successor official labor to be
performed for which he has received compensation, or which it was his duty to
'perform, he shall be liable to pay his successor the full value of such service,
which may be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction. p96, pp. 568-9.

CHAPTER 5.

Puncipal may include deputy, £ 2498,

5 4 8 . Offices a t c o u n t y s e a t s , w h e n . The clerks, recorders, and treasurers of all counties, and, except in counties having a population of less than
eight thousand, all other county officers, must have their offices at the countyseats; and in counties having a population of twenty thousand and over, the4
clerk, sheriff, recorder, auditor, treasurer, and attorney must keep their office
open for the transaction of business from nine o'clock a. m. until -five o'clock
p. m. ['96, p. 539.
5 4 9 . L i a b i l i t y o n b o n d . "Whenever, except in criminal prosecutions^
any special penalty, forfeiture, or liability is imposed upon any officer for non<
performance or mal-performance of his official duties, the liability therefoi
attaches to the official bond of such officer and to the principal and sureti
thereon.
Sup. Cal Codes (1893) p 607. Mont. Pol. C. }, 4324.

5 5 0 . Officer a b s e n t from c o u n t y . No county officer shall absent him
self from the county for a period of more than thirty days without the consent o
the board of count3' commissioners. ['96, p. 539.
5 5 1 . B o n d s of c o u n t y officers. A p p r o v a l . S u r e t i e s . Recording.
The board of county commissioners of each county in the state shall prescribe by3
ordinance the amount in which the following county and precinct officers sliall^
execute official bonds before entering upon the discharge of the duties of their
respective offices, viz: county treasurer, county clerk, county auditor, sheriff,
county attorney, recorder, assessor, county surveyor, county superintendent of
district schools, justice of the peace, and constable; provided, that the bond
of the county treasurer shall not be fixed in an amount less than one-half the,
total amount of the taxes collected in the county during the preceding year. The
judge or judges of the distinct court shall prescribe the amount in which eaclr"
member of the board of county commissioners must execute an official bond before;
entering upon the discharge of the duties of his office. The bonds and sureties.

Official bonds generally, \\ 1682-1686.

552. Officers to complete business at end of term. It shall be the

COUNTY TREASURER.
5 5 3 . D u t i e s . The county treasurer shall:
1. Receive all money belonging to the county and all other money by law
directed to be paid to hini, safely keep the same, and apply and pay it out, and
tender an account thereof as required by law.
2. Keep an account of the receipts and expenditures of all such money, in
books provided for the purpose, in which must be entered the amount, the time
?when, from whom, and on what account any money was received by him; the
amount, time when, to whom, and on what account all disbursements were made
y him.
3. Disburse county money only on county warrants issued by the county
auditor, except on settlements with the state.
4. Disburse the money in the treasury on such warrants only when they are
based on orders of the board of county commissioners, or upon order of the
district court, or as otherwise provided by law.
5. File and keep the certificates of the auditor delivered to him when
'money is paid into the treasury.
6. So keep his books that the amount received and paid out on account of
separate funds or specific appropriations are exhibited in separate and distinct
''accounts, and the whole receipts and expenditures shown in one general or cash
account.
7. Perform such other duties as are or may be required bv law. PC L
101; >96, p. 540*.
t Fees of treasurer, § 975.

> 5 5 4 . A u d i t o r ' s certificate t o a c c o m p a n y m o n e y . H e must receive
no money into the treasury except taxes unless accompanied by the certificate of
the auditor provided for in chapter eight of this title.
Sup. Cal. C. (1893) p. 609*.

555.

M u s t g i v e receipt.

When any money is paid into the county
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holding said court. The stipulation must specify the place of trial or hearing,
and must be filed in the office of the clerk. [C. L. §§ 3045-6.
6 8 4 . J u d g e p r o t e m p o r e . Any cause pending in a district court may
be tried by a judge pro tempore, who shall be a member of the bar of the supreme
court of the state. ['96, p. 94.
Judge pro tempore, Con. art. 8, sec. 5.

6 8 5 . Id. A p p o i n t m e n t .
P o w e r s . Whenever all the parties to any
cause pending in a district court or their attorneys of record shall enter into a
written stipulation appointing a judge pro tempore for the trial of the cause, and
the person appointed shall take and subscribe an oath to faithfully try and determine the issues joined between the party or parties plaintiff, naming them, and
the party or parties defendant, naming them, and any other parties, if such there
be, naming them, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court in which such
action is pending to attach together said stipulation and oath and to place them
on file and also to record them at length upon the minutes of the court; whereupon the person appointed shall be vested with the same power and authority
and shall be charged with the same duties as to the cause in and as to which he
is appointed as though he were the regularly elected and qualified judge of the
district court; provided, that parties may, by the terms of their stipulation, limit
the power of the judge pro tempore to the trial and determination of any specified issue or issues, either of law or fact, and in such case, the oath of the person
appointed shall correspond to the terms of the stipulation. ['96, p. 94.
6 8 6 . Id. C o m p e n s a t i o n . Judges pro tempore shall serve without compensation from any public treasury, but it shall be lawful for the parties to agree
upon and express in their written stipulation any mode or amount of compensation, together with any further agreement as to the taxing of the same as costs.
['96, p. 94.

5. I n actions to recover the possession of personal property, when the value
of such property is less than three hundred dollars.
6. To take and enter judgment on the confession of a defendant, when tli€
amount confessed is less than three hundred dollars. [C. L. § 3020*.
Jurisdiction, etc., Con. art. 8, sec. 8. Juriadiction of city justice under city ordinances. §239.
Authority to impose a fine in any sum less than
thTee hundred dollars and an imprisonment for a
term not exceeding six months, is in excess of the
jurisdiction which the legislature could confer on
justices of the peace under the organic act. Peopie, ex rel. Yearian, v. Spiers, 4 u. 385; 11 P. 509.
The legislature of the territory could confer on
justices of the peace no jurisdiction in criminal
cases, except that usually exercised by such justices of uhe peace at the date of the passage of the
organic act. Id. Justices of the peace, under the
statutes of the territory, have jurisdiction to try
an offender charged with the crime of battery.
Overruling Yearian v. Spiers, 4 U. 385. People
v. Douglass, 5 U. 283; 14 P. 801. A justice of the
peace acting within his jurisdiction is not liable for
mistakes of judgment, although the facts do not

JUSTICES' COURTS.

687. Place of residence and of holding court. Every justice of the
peace shall reside in and shall hold a justice's court in the precinct or city for
which he is elected; provided, t h a t where more than one precinct is embraced
within the limits of any incorporated city or town, the justices of the peac6 of
such precincts may hold court at any place within their respective cities or towns.
[C. L. §§ 3019*, 3042*; >97, p. 263.
6 8 8 . Civil j u r i s d i c t i o n . The justices' courts shall have civil jurisdiction
within their respective precincts or cities:
1. In actions arising on contract for the recovery of money only, if the sum
claimed is less than three hundred dollars.
2. In actions for damages for injury to the person, or for taking or detaining personal property, or for an injury to real property where no issue is raised
by the answer involving the plaintiff's title to or possession of the same, if the
damages claimed be less than three hundred dollars.
3. In actions for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture, less than three hundred dollars, given by statute or by the ordinances of an incorporated city, where no issue
is raised by the answer involving the legality of any tax, .impost, assessment, toll,
or municipal fine.
4. In actions upon bonds or undertakings conditioned for the payment of
money, if the sum claimed is less than three hundred dollars, though the penalty
m f l i r AYOAPrl
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warrant his conclusion. Marks v. Sullivan, 0 V
12; B3 P. 224. A justice of the peace canno
include in his judgment interest on the sui
claimed from the time the suit was brought, if i
makes the total amount of the judgment excee
$300; but the allowance of such interest does nc
deprive him of original jurisdiction so as to niak
the judgment void and unappealable. On apper
of such judgment the district court may alio-'
interest on the sum claimed,frorn the time the suit
brought, though the judgment, on account of sue
allowance, exceeds the amount for which the ju
tice could have rendered judgment. MeCormic
Har. Machine Company v. Marchant, 11 U. 68; J
P. 483.
Jurisdiction of city justice is co-extensivc wit
city. Saunders v. Sioux City N. Co., 6 U. 431; S
P. 532.

6 8 9 . C o n c u r r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n . T h e justices' courts shall have concui
rent jurisdiction with the district courts within their respective precincts an
cities:
1. I n actions of forcible entry, forcible detainer, or unlawful detainer, whei
the whole amount of the rent and damages claimed is less than three hundre
dollars.
2. I n actions to enforce and foreclose liens on personal property, where tr
amount of the liens and the value of the property are each less than three hiu
dred dollars. [C. L. § 3021.
Questions of possession of real property may be
adjudicated by justices of peace in forcible entry

CHAPTER 4.
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or detainer actions. Hyndman v. Stowe, 9 U. i
33 P. 227.

6 9 0 . P r o c e s s t o a n y p a r t of c o u n t y . Mesne and final process
justices' courts may be issued to anjr part of the county in which they are hel
[C. L. § 3022.
6 9 1 . C r i m i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . Justices' courts have jurisdiction of tl
following public offenses committed within the respective counties in wTii<
such courts are established:
1. Petit larceny.
2. Assault or battery not charged to have been committed upon a pub]
officer in the discharge of his duties, or to have been committed with such inte
as to render the act a felony.
3. Breaches of the peace, committing a wilful injury to property, and i
misdemeanors punishable by a fine less t h a n three hundred dollars, or by impr
onment in the county jail or city prison not exceeding six months, or by bo
such fine and imprisonment. [C. L. § 3023*.

CHAPTER 5.
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES.
6 9 2 . W h e n disqualified. Except by consent of all parties, no justii
judge, nor justice of the peace shall sit or act as such in any action or proceedir
1. To which he is a party, or in which he is interested.
2. When he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within 1
third degree, computed according to the rules of law.
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CODE OF C R I M I N A L PROCEDURE.

4 6 0 7 . M a g i s t r a t e defined. A magistrate is an officer having power to
issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public offense.
Cal. Pen. (J. i 807; Mont. Pen. C. \ 1373.

4 6 0 8 . M a g i s t r a t e s e n u m e r a t e d . The following persons are magistrates :
1. The justices of the supreme court.
2. The judges of the district courts.
3. Justices of the peace. [C. L. § 4836*.

4614.

Complainant must name witnesses.

9(
Subpoena.

Evei

person making complaint charging the commission of a crime or public offens
must inform the magistrate of all persons whom he believes to have any knowled
of its commission, and the magistrate, at the time of issuing the warrant, mi
issue subpoenas for such persons, requiring them to attend at a specified time ai
plav e as witnesses.
N. Dak. (1895) <5 7800; Mont. Pen. C. \ 1594.

Cal. Pen. C £ 80S*.

4 6 0 9 . P e a c e officers e n u m e r a t e d . A peace officer is a sheriff of a
county or his deputy, or a constable, or a marshal or policeman of any incorporated city or town. [C. L. § 5390.

CHAPTER 13.
WARRANT OF ARREST.

Mont. Pen. C. $ 1375*.

4615. Issuance of warrant.
CHAPTER 1 2 .
COMPLAINT
4 6 1 0 . W h a t a c o m p l a i n t m u s t s t a t e . The complaint must state:
1. The name of the person accused, if known, or if not known and it is so
stated, he may be designated by any other name.
2. The county in which the offense was committed.
3. The general name of the ciime or public offense.
4. T h e acts or omissions complained of as constituting the crime or public
offense named.
5. The person against whom, or against whose property the offense was
committed, if known.
6. If the offense is against the property of any person, a general description of such property. The complaint must be subscribed and sworn to by the
complainant.
N. Dak (1895) ^ 7886; Mont. Pen C $ 1590J\
Complaint defined, <? 4604
Information or complaint must show that a eiime
has been committed
Matter of Catherine Wise*

man, 1 U. 39 Ciiminal complaint may be sworn to
upon information and belief tf. S. v Eldredge, 5
U. 161; 13 P. 673

4611. Any person having knowledge must make complaint.
Every person who has reason to believe t h a t a crime or public offense has been
committed, must make complaint against such person before some magistrate
having authority to make inquiry of the same.
N. Dak. (1895) ^ 7887, Mont Pen C. % 1591*.

When person concealing crime an accessory, {J 4075.

4 6 1 2 . M a g i s t r a t e m u s t e x a m i n e c o m p l a i n a n t . W i t n e s s e s . When
a complaint is made beiore a magistrate, charging a person with the commission
of a crime or public offense, such magistrate must examine the complainant,
under oath, as to his knowledge of the commission of the offense charged, and he
may also examine any other persons and may take their depositions. [C. L:
§ 4837*
N Dak. (1895) £ 7888; Mont Pen. C. £ 1592'*.
Complaint of commission of crime in another
countv; accused being in county where compiamt

made, 4 4630
£4tfl5

Complaint, issuance of warrant,

4613. When arrest made without warrant complaint to be filed.
When any officer or < ther person shall bring any peison he has arrested without
a warrant before a magistiate, it is the duty of such officer or person to specify the
charge upon which he has made the a n est. I t is then the duly of the magistrate
or the county attorney to make a complaint of the offense charged, and cause the
officer or person, or some other peison, t'> subscribe and make oaih to such complaint, and file it.

Consent of county attorney.

Wt

acomnla nt, verified by oath or affirmation, is made before a magistrate, chargi
the commission of a crime or public offense, he must, if satisfied therefrom that 1
offense complained of has been committed, and t h a t there is reasonable ground
believe t h a t the accused committed it, issue a warrant for his arrest; but wl
the magistrate before whom the complaint is made is a justice of the peace, bef<
issuing the warrant, the complaint, if made by any person other than the com
attorney of the county, and other evidence taken by such magistrate relating to
offense charged, must be submitted to such county attorney, and he must exa
ine into the charge and enter either his approval or disapproval of the issuance
a warrant upon such complaint. If the county attorney disapproves, no warr
shall be issued, but if he approves the issuance of a warrant, such magistrate si
proceed accordingly; provided, that in ca c es when it appears from statement?
tLe complaint or other written evidence submitted to t h e magistrate that
accused is likely to escape from the county before the approval of the cou
attorney can be had, as hereinbefore prescribe,!, a warrant may issue without
approval of the county attorney. No justice of the peace shall receive any
or allowances whatever for any act done or services rendered in a criminal ad
or proceeding commenced or prosecuted in disregard of the provisions of this
tion. [O. L. § 4839*.
N Dak (1895) ?/ 7891*
Foim of complaint, ^ 4610. Magistrate defined, §4608.

4 6 1 6 . W a r r a n t defined. F o r m . A warrant of arrest is an orde
writing in the name of the state, signed by a magistrate, commanding the ar
of the defendant, and may be substantially in the following form:
STATE OF U T A H , ^ }
COUNTY OF
. j

The state of Utah to any sheriff, constable, marshal, or policeman of said s1
or of the county of
:
Complaint on oath having been this day made before me, by A B, thai
crime of (designating i t ) , has been committed, and accusing C D thereof, yon
therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above named C D, and bring
before me at (naming the place) or in case of my absence or inability to act, b*
the nearest or most acces ible magistrate in this county. Dated at
day of
, eighteen
.
When necessary, the magistrate may insert therein a clause to the effect
if the accused has fled from justice, t h a t the peace officer pursue him into
-other county of this state and there arrest him. [C. L. § 4840.
Cal. Pen. C. ^ 814'\

4 6 1 7 . Id. R e q u i s i t e s . The warrant must specify the name of the dei
ant, or, if it is unknown to the magistrate, the defendant may be desigi
+hArphi hv anv name. I t must also state the time of issuing it, and the cot
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PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
4649. Officer arresting with warrant must proceed lawfully,

CHAPTER 1 5 ,

officer making an arrest in obedience to a warrant, must proceed with the perso
arrested as commanded by the warrant, or as provided by law. [C. L. § 4866.,

RETAKING AFTER ESCAPE OR RESCUE

Cal Pen C £ 848

4650. Arrest without warrant. Delivery of prisoner. Complain
When an arrest shall be made without a warrant by a peace officer or private p"
son, the person arrested must, without unnecessary delay, be taken to the near
or most accessible magistrate in the county in which the arrest is made, and
complaint, stating the charge against the person, must be made before such n r
istrate. A conductor or other person who shall have made an arrest as provid
in subdivision four of section forty-six hundred and thirty-eight, shall, witho
unnecessary delay, take the person so arrested before any accessible magista
or deliver him to a peace officer; and a complaint, stating the charge against i
person, must be made before such magistrate; and the magistrate before wh
such charge shall be made, if the offense is triable by him, shall have full jur
diction over said offense and the defendant, to try and determine said offense. *
he have not jurisdiction to try the defendant for the offense charged, he m
proceed as provided in chapter sixteen of this title. [C. L. § 4867.

4 6 5 5 . P u r s u i t a n d rearrest. If a person arrested escapes or is res, the person from whose custody he shall have escaped or shall have been
cued, may immediately pursue and retake him at any time and in any place
| r i n the state. [C. L. § 4870.
l l . Pen C ?854
-lapes, U 4114-4118

escued, the person pursuing may break open an outer or inner door or window
dwelling-house or other building, if, after notice of his intention, he is
sed admittance. [C. L. § 4871.
, Pen C 4 855

CHAPTER 16.
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

4651. Service of warrant by telegraph. Procedure. Any m*

Cal Pen C i 850 *

4 6 5 2 . Id. C e r t i f i c a t i o n a n d r e t u r n . Every officer causing telegra
copies of warrants to be sent, must certify as correct and file in the tele_
office from which such copies are sent, a copy of the warrant and indorse
thereon, and must return the original with a statement of his action there"
[C. L. § 4869.
Cal Pen C \ 851

4653. Officer may direct arrest by telegraph. In all cases wh
law a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant, or, having a w~
for the arrest of a person accused of a public offense, and such person may
wise escape from this state, such officer may, by telegraph, direct any sli
constable, marshal, or policeman in this state to arrest such person, and des
the accused in said order by name, or description, or both.
N Dak (1895) § 7939

4 6 5 4 . Id. A r r e s t a n d d e t e n t i o n of p r i s o n e r . The order
directed generally to any of such officers, and executed by the officer rec
it. The officer executing any such order shall take into liis custody the _
designated therein and detain him upon such order for such length of tf
shall be necessary for the officer directing the arrest to reach the place of
tion by the ordinary means and course of travel, or until sooner demand
an officer having a warrant for the arrest of such person, but in no cas
the officer arresting such person upon such order detain him longer th
time hereinbefore mentioned.
N Dak (1895) ? 7940

Rescues, H 4112, 4113. Justifiable homicide in retaking felon, ? 41G7

4656. Id. May break door or window. To retake the person escaping

Cal Pen C ^ 840*.
Failure to take person arie&ted before magistrate without delay, a misdemeanor, ? 4139

trate may, by an indorsement upon a warrant of arrest, authorize the ser
thereof by telegraph, and thereafter a telegraphic copy of such warrant ma;
sent by telegraph to one or more peace officers, and such copy is as effectu
the hands of any officer, and he must proceed in the same manner under iti
though he held an original warrant issued by the magistrate making the ind
ment. [C. L. § 4868^
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4657.

Magistrate to inform prisoner of his rights.

When the

dant shall be brought before the magistrate upon an arrest, either with or
out a warrant, on a charge of having committed a public offense, the magismust immediately inform him of the charge against him, and of his right
e aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings. [C. L. § 4872.
£Pen C. \ 858.
•
Iit3 of accused peison, Con. art. 1, sees. 7-12,
\

Defendant b y waiving preliminary examination
waives all defects in complaint again&t him U S
v. Eldiedge, 5 TJ. 161; 13 P . 673.
_ J

4658. Time to procure counsel allowed. Message to counsel,
ust also allow the defendant a reasonable time to send for counsel, and
one the examination for that purpose, and must, upon the request of the
dant, require a peace officer to take a message to any counsel in the preor the city the defendant may name. The officer must, without delay and
out fee, perform that duty. [C. L. § 4873.
Pen. C. i 859.

Eight to counsel, Con. art. 1, sec. 12

' 6 5 9 . E x a m i n a t i o n t o b e p r o c e e d e d w i t h . At the time set for the
g, the magistrate before whom the accused is brought must, unless a change
ce of trial is had under the provisions of the next section, immediately
the appearance of counsel, or if none appears, after waiting a reasonable
therefor, if the accused requires the aid of counsel, proceed to examine the
; [C. L. § 4874*.
k. (1895) <>7952
veT of prehminaiy examination with consent of state, Con. ait. l t sec. 13

660. Change of place of trial. Affidavit.

Transfer.

Whenever

on accused of a public offense is brought before a justice of the peace for
nation and, at any time before such examination is commenced, he files
•^such justice his affidavit stating t h a t by reason of the bias or prejudice of
I justice he believes he cannot have a fair and impartial examination before
such justice must transfer said action, and all the papers therein, including
/'fied copy of his docket entries, to another justice of t h e same county; pro, that unless the parties agree upon the justice to whom said action shall be
"erred, it shall be sent to the nearest justice of the county, but no more than
change of the place of examination under this section shall be had in an
n.
k (1895) ^ 7953
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4 6 6 1 . Limitation on postponement, unless by consent. The examination must be completed at one session, unless the magistrate, for good caus4
shown, postpone it. The postponement shall not be for more than four days a1;
each time, nor more than twelve daj^s in all, unless by consent or on motion < *
the defendant. [C. L. § 4875*.

timony and proceedings to be .taken down in shorthand, in all examinations
erein mentioned, and for that purpose he may appoint a stenographer. The
eposition or testimony of the witness must be authenticated in the following
orm:
1. It must state the name of the witness, his place of residence, and his
business or profession.
2. It must contain the questions put to the witness, and his answers thereto,
h answer being distinctly read to him as it is taken down, and being corrected
or added to until it conforms to what he declares is the truth; except that in cases
$here the testimony shall be taken down in shorthand, the answer or answers of
e witness need not be read to him.
3. If a question put is objected to on either side and ovei^ruled, or the witess declines answering it, that fact, with the ground on which the question shall
ave been overruled or the answer declined, must be stated.
4. The deposition must be signed by the witness, or if he refuse to sign it,
is reason for refusing must be stated in writing as he gives it, except that in
Bases where the deposition shall be taken down in shorthand, it need not be
*gned by the witness.
5. It must be signed and certified by the magistrate when reduced to writing
by him, or under his direction, and when taken down in shorthand, the transcript
I the stenographer appointed as aforesaid, when written out in longhand, and
ertined
as being a correct statement of such testimony and procedings in the case,
:
phall be prima facie a correct statement of such testimony and proceedings. The
tenographer shall, if the defendant is held to answer the charge, within ten days
•fter the close of such examination, transcribe his said shorthand notes into longand, and certify and file the same with the clerk of the district court of the
unty in which the defendant shall have been examined, and shall in all cases
e his original notes with said clerk. The stenographer's fees shall be paid out
f the treasury of the county. [C. L. § 4883*.
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Cal. Pen C. ? 861*

4662. Id. Defendant to give bail or be committed. If a postponement is had, the magistrate must commit the defendant for examination, admi
him to bail, or discharge him from custody upon the deposit of money as provided
in this code, as security for Ins appearance at the time to which the examination
is postponed. [C. L. § 4876.
Cal Pen C § 862

Bail, W 4983-5010.

4 6 6 3 . F o r m of c o m m i t m e n t for e x a m i n a t i o n . The commitment fo*
examination shall be made by an indorsement, signed by the magistrate on tli*
warrant of arrest, to the following effect: " The within named A B, having beeij
brought before me under this warrant, is committed for examination to thesheri
of
." If the sheriff be not present, the defendant ma}*- be committed
the custody of any peace officer. [C. L. § 4877.
Cal. Pen C. i 863

4 6 6 4 . M a g i s t r a t e m u s t issue subpoenas. The magistrate must issue;
subpoenas, subscribed by him, for witnesses within the state, required either b
the prosecution or the defense. [C. L. § 4878.
Cal Pen. C. ? 864'*.
Accused entitled to compulsory process for witnesses, Con. art. 1, sec. 12.

4 6 6 5 . Procedure on preliminary examination. At the examinati
the magistrate must first read to the defendant the complaint and the deposition
of the witnesses examined on making the complaint, if depositions were take
[C. L. § 4878*.
Cal. Pen. C. \ 864*.

4666. Id. Examination of witnesses in presence of defendan
The witnesses must be examined in the presence of the defendant, and may"
cross-examined in his behalf. [C. L. § 4879.
Cal. Pen C $ 885.
Accused entitled to be confronted by witnesses, Con. art. 1, sec. 12; \ 4613.

4667. Id.

Examination of defendant's witnesses.

When

examination of witnesses on the part of. the state shall have closed, any witnes
the defendant may produce may be sworn and examined. [C. L. § 4880.
Cal. Pen C \ 886.

4668. Id. Exclusion of witnesses. Keeping s e p a r a t e . While?
witness shall be under examination, the magistrate may exclude all witnes
who shall not have been examined. He may also cause the witnesses to be k
separate, and to be prevented from conversing with each other until they sh
have all been examined. [C. L. § 4881.
Cal Pen C $ 867.

Exclusion of witnesses and others, \ 696.

4 6 6 9 . Id. E x c l u s i o n of s p e c t a t o r s , etc., on request. The mag}
trate must also, upon the request of the defendant, exclude from the examinati"'
every person except his clerk, the prosecutor and his counsel, the attorney ge;
eral, the county attorney, the defendant and his counsel, and the officer havi
the defendant in custody. [C. L. § 4882*.
Cal Pen. C. I 868.

4670. W h e n t e s t i m o n y r e d u c e d to w r i t i n g . F o r m of depositi
The testimony of each witness in cases of homicide must be reduced to writing'
a deposition, by the magistrate, or under his direction; and in other cases up"
the demand of the prosecuting attorney. The magistrate before whom the ex~~

' Cal Pen. C. \ 869*.
Failure of reporter to file transcript does not prent defendant from being brought to trial where
pendant did not claim t h a t he was prejudiced
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thereby, and did not ask for a continuance in order
to secure same. People v. Thiede, 11 U. 241; 89 P .
837. Affirmed, Thiede v. People, 159 tJ. S. 510,

4 6 7 1 . Custody and disposition of depositions, etc. The magistrate
if his clerk must keep the depositions taken, and exhibits admitted as evidence
n the examination, until they shall be returned to the proper court; and must
t>t permit them to be examined or copied by any person except a judge of a court
ving jurisdiction of the offense, or authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus,
e attorney general, county attorney, or other prosecuting attorney, and the
efendant and his counsel. [C. L. § 4884.
Cal. Pen. C \ 870.

4672. Id. Violation of preceding section a crime. Every violation
the last section is punishable as a misdemeanor.
*•.!?. Dak. (1895^ §7963.

4673. Defendant discharged for want of probable cause. If, after

aring the proofs, it appears that either no public offense has been committed, or
at there is not sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty of a public offense,
% e magistrate must order the defendant to be discharged, by an indorsement
n the warrant or the complaint, signed by him, to the following effect: " There
eing no sufficient cause to believe the within named A. B guilty of the offense
fchin mentioned, I order him discharged." [C. L. § 4885*.
Cal. Pen. C. \ 871.

4674. Id. When costs taxed against complainant. If the defendant

n.a preliminar}^ examination for a public offense is discharged as provided in the
evious section, and if the magistrate finds that the prosecution was malicious
r without probable cause, he shall enter such judgment on his docket and tax
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the costs against the complaining witness, which shall be enforced a * judgments
for costs in criminal cases, and execution may issue therefor.
N Dak (1895) { 7965

4 6 7 5 . W h e n d e f e n d a n t h e l d t o a n s w e r . Order. If, however, it
appear from the examination that a public offense has been committed, and that
there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate
must indorse on the complaint an order, signed by him, to the following effect:
'' I t appearing to me that the offense in the within complaint mentioned (or any
offense, according to the fact, stating generally the nature thereof), has been
committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the within named A B
guilty thereof, I order that he be held to answer to the same." [C L § 4886*.
Cal Pen C §872"

4 6 7 6 . Id. Order w h e n offense n o t b a i l a b l e . If the offense is not
bailable, the following words, or words to the same effect, must be added to the
indorsement: "And that he is hereby committed to the sheriff of the county of
/» [C. L. §4887.
Cal Pen C $ 873

4 6 7 7 . Id. Order w h e n b a i l h a s b e e n t a k e n . If the offense is bailable, and bail is taken by the magistrate, the following words must be added to
the aforementioned indorsement: "And I have admitted him to bail to answer by
the undertaking hereto annexed." [C. L. §4888.
4 6 7 8 . Id. Order w h e n offense b a i l a b l e . If the offense is bailable
and the defendant is admitted to bail, but bail shall not have been given, the following words must be added to the order indorsed on the complaint: "And that
he is admitted to bail in the sum of
dollars, and is committed to the sheriff
of the county of
, until he gives such bail, or is legally discharged.' 1 [C. L.
§ 4889.
Cal Pen C i 875'

Bail, £j> 4983-5010

4 6 7 9 . C o m m i t m e n t t o b e d e l i v e r e d w i t h d e f e n d a n t . I t the magistrate orders the defendant to be committed, he must make out a commitment,
signed by himself, with his name of office, and deliver it, with the defendant, to
the officer to whom he is committed, or, if that officer is not present, to a peace
officer, who must immediately deliver the defendant into the proper custody,
together with the commitment. [C. L. § 4890.
Cal Pen C £876

4680.

Id.

STATE OF U T A H ,
COUNTY OF

F o r m of.

The commitment must be to the following effect^

\
. J

The state of Utah to the sheriff of the county of
:
An order having been this day made by me that A B be held to answer upon,
a charge of (stating briefly the nature of the offense, and giving as near as may
be the time when and the place where the same was committed), you are com-*
manded to receive him into your custody and detain him until he is legally
discharged.
Dated at
, this
day of
, 18
[C. L. § 4891.
Cal. Pen C i 877

4 6 8 1 . W i t n e s s e s m a y b e r e q u i r e d t o g i v e b o n d s . On holding the'
defendant to answer, the magistrate may take from each of the'material wit-J
nesses examined before him on the part of the state a written undertakings
without surety, to the effect that he will appear and testify at the court to which
the complaint and depositions are to be sent, or t h a t he will forfeit the sum ofl
two hundred dollars. [C. L. § 4892.
Cal. Pen. C. i 878*
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4 6 8 2 . Id. S u r e t i e s m a y b e r e q u i r e d . W h e n the magistrate or a
judge of the court in which the action is pending shall be satisfied, by proof on
oath, that there is reason to believe that any such witness will not appear and
testify unless security is required, he may order the witness to enter into a
written undertaking, with sureties, in such sum as he may deem proper, for his
appearance as specified in the last section. [C. L. § 4893.
Cal Pen C $ 879

4 6 8 3 . Id. W h e n w i t n e s s i s a m i n o r . When a minor is a material witness, any other person may be allowed to give an undertaking for the appearance
of such witness; or the magistrate may, in his discretion, take the undertaking of
such minor in a sum not exceeding fifty dollars, which shall be valid and binding
in law, notwithstanding the disability of minority.
Mont Pen C $ 1690*

4 6 8 4 . Id. C o m m i t m e n t for f a i l u r e t o g i v e . If a witness, required
to enter into an undertaking to appear and testify, either with or without sureties,
refuses compliance with the order for that purpose, the magistrate must commit
him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged. [C. L. § 4894.
Cal Pen C i 881.

4 6 8 5 . E x a m i n a t i o n of w i t n e s s u n a b l e t o g i v e b o n d . When, however, it shall satisfactorily appear, by examination on oath of the witness, or any
other person, that the witness is unable to procure sureties, he may be forthwith
conditionally examined on behalf of the state. Such examination must be by
question and answer, in the presence of the defendant, or after notice to him, if
on bail, and conducted in the same manner as the examination before a committing magistrate is required by this code to be conducted, and the witness must
thereupon be discharged; but this section shall not apply to an accomplice in
the commission of the offense charged. [C. L. § 4895.
Cal. Pen. C. £ 882

Use of such testimony, 4 4513

4686. Magistrate must return papers to district court. When a
magistrate shall have discharged a defendant, or shall have held him to answer,
he must return without delay, to the clerk of the court at which the defendant is
required to appear, the warrant if any, the complaint, the depositions if any, a
list of the names and the postoffice addresses of all witnesses for the state, if he
can ascertain them, and all undertakings of bail and for the appearance of witnesses taken b}' him, together with a certified copy of the record of the proceedings as it appears on his docket. [C. L. § 4896; '96, p. 312.
Cal. Pen. C. $ 883*

4687. When defendant a convict. Examination in prison. When
Dhe defendant is a convict in the state prison, or a prisoner in a county jail, the
Examination may be held in the office of the prison or jail. I n such cases the
commitment shall be directed to the warden of t h e prison or to the keeper of
the jail. ['96, p. 271*.

CHAPTER 1 7 .
PROSECUTION BY INFORMATION, INDICTMENT, OR ACCUSATION.
4 6 8 8 . P r o s e c u t i o n s i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o b e b y i n f o r m a t i o n , etc.
&11 public offenses triable in the district courts, except cases appealed from justices'
courts, must be prosecuted by information or indictment, except as provided in
the next section. [C. L. § 4897*.
Cal Pen C b 8B8y,\
Prosecution by information or indictment, Con. a i t . 1, bee 13, | 4509.

